Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

164 Appendix
If this line of criticism is correct, then the distinction both Davidson and I
favour can, in fact, be maintained.
A.3.3.2 The Prediction of Behaviour
In any case, let me come back to my initial question. Does the lawlessness
of intentional explanations mean that such explanations are not independently
testable? No, it does not. If I have certain beliefs and desires, then—
assuming I am a rational agent—this will have predictable consequences.
Since those consequences extend beyond the fact to be explained, an intentional
explanation will be independently testable. If you see me walking
into the bank and posit that I intend to rob it, then you can form a pretty
accurate idea of how I would act, on the assumption that this is true. You
may predict, for instance, that I will make some effort to hide my identity,
or that I will approach a teller and issue some kind of threat. And there are
things you would not predict, whose occurrence would fail to corroborate
the hypothesis. If I intend to rob the bank, you would not expect me to fi ll
in a deposit form or to approach the teller and discuss the weather. The
more successful predictions you make, the more we have the consilience of
confi rmed deductions that will corroborate your explanation. Such predictions
do not depend on laws, but they are nonetheless predictions, which
can be tested.
It is true that we can attribute extra beliefs and desires to our agent in
order to explain why she did not act as we might expect. (This seems to be
Davidson’s point about the “holism of the mental.” 69 ) But the parallel here
with the sciences is quite precise. It is always possible to amend a scientifi c
theory by way of auxiliary hypothesis so as to prevent its falsifi cation. This
is a corollary of the Duhem-Quine thesis, which points out that hypotheses
are not tested one-by-one, but in bundles (as it were). But this does not
prevent scientifi c theories from being independently testable. On the one
hand, we can often test the auxiliary assumptions independently. 70 On the
other hand, the reformulated theory (that is to say, with the new auxiliary
assumptions) can be used to make new predictions. At the end of the day,
we may have to recognise that the theory in question represents a “degenerating
research programme” and that the most rational thing (particularly if
a better explanation is on offer) would be to abandon it. 71
A.3.4 An Illustration
Let me illustrate the points I have been making by borrowing and adapting
one of Jaegwon Kim’s examples. 72 Let’s say you are in a meeting with your
colleague Sally. You see her stand up and move around the room. Since you
already know that the room is stuffy, you conjecture that Sally intends to
get some fresh air. If this were true, it would explain her behaviour. So it
is a potential explanation. But is it the actual one? After all, many other
intentions might explain her moving around the room. To conclude that