Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

Appendix 159
action, one that has a description of the agent’s action as its conclusion. But
the attempt to create a second-order explanation—one that would explain
the formation of this particular intention—will inevitably fail. The agent’s
action is a rational one, given his intention. But the intention is not one that
he should have formed, given this beliefs and desires. 49
Incidentally, this view of akrasia enables us to distinguish an incontinent
action from a wicked one. 50 This distinction seems useful. One could, perhaps,
describe akrasia as a moral fault, but we are naturally inclined to say
that it represents a weakness rather than a perversity. A wicked action, on
this view, enacts an intention that is rational, given the agent’s beliefs and
desires. What makes the action wicked is that the beliefs and desires on
which the agent is acting are morally inappropriate. The Nazi killer, who
believes that the good of humanity requires the extermination of the Jews,
and who desires to serve humanity in this task, is acting rationally in forming
his wicked intention. The problem is that the beliefs and desires on which
he is acting rationally are, respectively, mistaken and morally perverse.
This view has an apparently paradoxical implication. A person could
hold Nazi beliefs and desires yet through weakness of will fail to act on
them. (If Heinrich Himmler’s words are to be believed, it took some effort
to overcome one’s natural feelings in order to kill Jews. 51 ) But this means
that akrasia is not always a morally undesirable condition. Like Huckleberry
Finn, whose feelings for Jim prevented him from acting in accordance
with his (false) moral convictions, 52 we may sometimes be prevented from
evil-doing precisely by weakness of will.
A.3 TESTING INTENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS
Is an intentional explanation testable? What predictions does it allow us to
make? Could such an explanation be corroborated?
A.3.1 Asking the Agent
There is one prediction an intentional explanation allows us to make which
is so obvious that we might overlook it. We could predict what the agent’s
verbal behaviour would be when asked about his intentions. If his response
to our question corresponds to our proposed explanation, this will corroborate
our explanation. (“Why did you pull over and stop?” “Because the
policeman signaled me to do so.” “Why did you vote for the tax increase?”
“Because I think that subsidised childcare is more important than having
a little more cash.”) This would seem the most straightforward manner
of testing an intentional explanation, although of course it is not always
available. The agent may be dead, as in the case of historical explanations,
or otherwise inaccessible. It is true that if the subject replies to our question,
her doing so is itself an intentional action. 53 So if we take her reply