Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

50 Theism and Explanation
literally. They say, for instance, that God is a “person” who “knows” things
and can “bring about” states of affairs. 70 If such propositions are in fact
coherent, it can only be because such language is being used analogically.
But precisely because such language is being used analogically, we cannot
directly demonstrate its internal coherence, since we cannot specify exactly
what it does and does not mean. This might appear to constitute a fatal
objection to a theistic hypothesis: if we cannot demonstrate its coherence,
why should we accept it? Swinburne’s response is that we can establish
the coherence of theism indirectly, by showing that there is good reason to
believe that there exists a God who has these apparently incompatible properties.
71 And, of course, Swinburne has devoted much of his life to arguing
for the existence of the Christian God.
Does this offer the theist a way out? Well, perhaps the charge of incoherence
is not fatal (3.3.4), but Swinburne underestimates its seriousness. I
shall argue later that Swinburne’s arguments for the existence of God are
best thought of as abductive arguments (6.1.3). But if someone is offering
an abductive argument, then it seems vital that his hypothesis be consistent.
The reason is simple, and will become clear if we call to mind Peirce’s
schema for abductive reasoning (2.1.2).
(1) The surprising fact, E, is observed.
(2) But if H were true, E would be a matter of course,
(3) Hence, there is reason to suspect that H is true.
A potential explanation, I argued, is one that satisfi es the second premise
of this schema. The key question in each case is: What would follow, if H
were true? But it is a well-known principle of at least classical logic that
from a contradiction anything follows: ex contradictione quodlibet, in its
traditional Latin formulation. 72 Let’s say, for the sake of the argument, that
the theistic hypothesis (H) does embody a contradiction. (If this were true,
we could easily be unaware of it, especially if the language we are using is
being used analogically.) Let’s say, for instance, that God simply could not
be both perfectly just and perfectly merciful, but that our theistic hypothesis
attributes both qualities to him. Then whatever the explanandum is, we
could derive from H a proposition describing it. For the same reason, we
could apparently corroborate H by appealing to any fact whatever. 73 But this
is equivalent to saying that a self-contradictory hypothesis could never be an
acceptable explanation. While we have reason to doubt the consistency of
the theistic hypothesis, we have reason to treat it with some suspicion.
3.3.4 The Consistency Requirement
It follows that we should not underestimate the seriousness of the charge
of internal incoherence. But neither should we overestimate it, for it may
not be a fatal objection. Are there circumstances in which we would be