Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

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Successful Theistic Explanations 133 Swinburne adopts what we may call a “metaphysical” conception of simplicity. 68 The simplicity of a theory, he writes, is a matter of its postulating few (logically independent) entities, few properties of entities, few kinds of entities, few kinds of properties, properties more readily observable, few separate laws with few terms relating few variables, the simplest formulation of each law being mathematically simple. 69 This is a very broad defi nition indeed, and its application to theism is problematic. 70 Is God really, as Swinburne argues, “the simplest kind of person there could be?” 71 As we have seen (3.3.1), there does exist a theistic doctrine of divine simplicity, which in some form or other Swinburne wishes to endorse. 72 But one could argue, with Cleanthes (and Plantinga), 73 that this doctrine is incompatible with the idea that God is a personal agent. And what about the doctrine of the Trinitarian nature of God? Is this compatible with the idea that God is “the simplest kind of person there is?” 74 Perhaps it is, but the theist at least has a case to answer here. 7.4.1 Auxiliary Hypotheses Swinburne’s criterion of simplicity is closely related to what I shall call “ontological economy,” and which I shall discuss in a moment (7.5). I favour a rather different defi nition of simplicity, which is broadly Popperian in fl avour and which is most clearly expressed in the work of Paul Thagard. Karl Popper offers what at fi rst sight seems an idiosyncratic defi nition of simplicity. The simplicity of a theory, he suggests, is equivalent to its empirical content or degree of falsifi ability. 75 Building on this foundation, Thagard argues that simplicity has to do with the number of auxiliary hypotheses that a theory requires in order to explain the fact in question. The fewer the auxiliary hypotheses, the simpler the theory. Note how Thagard’s conception of simplicity differs from Swinburne’s. Thagard does not argue that one theory (T 1 ) should be preferred to another (T 2 ) simply because T 1 postulates the existence of fewer entities. In fact, he argues that we may prefer a theory that postulates more entities than its competitors if it has greater explanatory power or, in Thagard’s terms, if it contributes to consilience. 76 The important fact—that which makes a theory simple in Thagard’s sense—is that it contributes towards consilience “without making a host of assumptions with narrow application.” 77 At fi rst sight, Thagard’s conception of simplicity may seem different from Popper’s, but in fact the two are closely related. For a theory that is preserved from refutation only with the aid of auxiliary hypotheses loses empirical content. It is, in Popper’s terms, less falsifi able and to this extent more complex. 78 This account of simplicity, as developed by Thagard, seems more workable than Swinburne’s conception, which requires us to count the number of entities or principles a theory employs. Any such count will
134 Theism and Explanation inevitably be arbitrary, for the entities posited by a theory can be identifi ed in different ways. 7.4.2 Van Inwagen’s Defence How would a proposed theistic explanation rate, when assessed against this view of simplicity? This is a diffi cult question to answer, since an account of divine action lacks the precision of a scientifi c theory (7.6) and it is hard to distinguish the core of such an account from its auxiliary hypotheses. But let me look at just one case where this distinction can be made, which I have adapted from an example given by Peter van Inwagen. I should begin by clarifying van Inwagen’s position. He believes he does not need to show that theism is the best explanation (or even a potential explanation) of any fact about the world. He is apparently convinced, along with Alvin Plantinga, that belief in God can be a matter of warranted, undefeated, basic belief. 79 It follows, he thinks, that the theist requires no arguments in support of her belief in God. However, van Inwagen is countering the argument that theism is not the best explanation of what we observe, since there is a better explanation, namely the hypothesis of indifference. And the way in which van Inwagen develops his defence is by offering scenarios that function, in effect, as auxiliary hypotheses, bridging the gap between his theistic beliefs and the observable data. As the reader will have guessed, van Inwagen’s particular target is Paul Draper’s evidential argument from evil. As we have seen (5.4.4 and 7.1.3), Draper argues that the distribution of pain and pleasure which we observe in the world (E) is more likely given what he calls the “hypothesis of indifference” (HI) than given theism (T). According to Draper’s hypothesis of indifference, “neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by nonhuman persons.” 80 So Draper’s argument arrives at the conclusion that the likelihood of what we observe given the hypothesis of indifference is greater than the likelihood of what we observe given theism: Pr(E|HI) > Pr(E|T). This would lend support to the hypothesis of indifference. How does van Inwagen counter this argument? Well, as we have already seen (5.4.3.1), he defends theism by expressing scepticism about the premises of Draper’s argument. Van Inwagen’s scepticism takes two forms. 81 I have already described his modal scepticism. But he also adopts what he calls a “moral scepticism,” by which he means a scepticism about our capacity to judge the comparative moral value of states of affairs. To lend force to his scepticism, van Inwagen offers a number of theistic scenarios that would account for the existence of evil. He is not suggesting that any of these is probably true. (He is not offering a theodicy, but merely
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Theism and Explanation
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Theism and Explanation Gregory W. D
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To Anna who never tires of asking
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Acknowledgements My thanks are due
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Figure 2.2 Swinburne’s conception
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On Explanations in General 27 simil
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3 What are Theistic Explanations? I
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What are Theistic Explanations? 35
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3.2.2 Positing a Divine Agent What
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4 What Would They Explain? It’s a
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4.2 SINGULAR AND GENERAL EXPLANATIO
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What Would They Explain? 63 shelter
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What Would They Explain? 65 were we
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What Would They Explain? 67 not des
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What Would They Explain? 69 must of
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What Would They Explain? 71 to prod
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What Would They Explain? 73 There i
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What Would They Explain? 75 how mig
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78 Theism and Explanation contradic
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80 Theism and Explanation low—tha
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Page 109 and 110: 98 Theism and Explanation (2.1.2) t
Page 112 and 113: 6 Inference to the Best Explanation
Page 114 and 115: Inference to the Best Explanation 1
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Page 156 and 157: Conclusion 145 explanation that met
Page 158 and 159: Appendix Intentional Explanations M
Page 160 and 161: Appendix 149 attend any discussion
Page 162 and 163: Appendix 151 explanation is a causa
Page 164 and 165: Appendix 153 we assume is a “myth
Page 166 and 167: Appendix 155 Will this suffi ce as
Page 168 and 169: Appendix 157 reasoning, Schueler su
Page 170 and 171: Appendix 159 action, one that has a
Page 172 and 173: Appendix 161 estimate of her charac
Page 174 and 175: Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
Page 176 and 177: Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
Page 178 and 179: Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers
Page 180 and 181: Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
Page 182 and 183: Notes 171 19. Musgrave, “Scientif
Page 184 and 185: Notes 173 the most explicit in its
Page 186 and 187: Notes 175 any true proposition, the
Page 188 and 189: Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
Page 190 and 191: Notes 179 15. Hume, “Dialogues,
Page 192 and 193: Notes 181 19. Swinburne, Is There a
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Notes 183 it will also confi rm H 2
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Notes 185 91. I am grateful to Geor
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Notes 187 this be a fatal objection
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Notes 189 71. Lakatos, “Falsifi c
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192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
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194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
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196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
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198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
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200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
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Index A abduction: and induction, 1
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defences, and theodicies, 134-35 de
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intelligent design theory: argument
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preemption, causal. See causal pree
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tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
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