Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

5 Potential Theistic Explanations
What a book a devil’s chaplain might write on the clumsy, wasteful,
blundering, low, and horribly cruel works of nature.
Charles Darwin
In my opening chapter (1.3), I distinguished between potential and actual
(or successful) explanations. I suggested that I needed this distinction—or
something like it—in order to distinguish between de facto and in principle
objections to proposed theistic explanations. A de facto objection accepts
that some accounts of divine action are potential explanations. If they were
true, then the explanandum is what we would expect. But it argues that
such proposed explanations have been superseded by secular alternatives,
which we have more reason to accept. An in principle objection goes further.
It argues that no account of divine action could have any explanatory
force. Even if such an account were true, there is no conceivable state of
affairs which it could be said to explain.
In this chapter, I shall argue that this in principle objection is wrong.
One can at least conceive of situations in which talk of divine action would
be explanatory. In this sense, the atheist has no “silver bullet,” which will
“put a merciful end to all the nonsense.” 1 He cannot assume, without further
investigation, that a proposed theistic explanation is worthless. But
he can ask if this particular story of divine action constitutes a potential
explanation of this particular state of affairs. And the key question here is
that posed by David Hume: Is this state of affairs what we would expect of
“a very powerful, wise, and benevolent Deity?” 2 If it is not, then no talk of
divine action could explain it.
But I’m leaping ahead. Let me pause for a moment to summarise the
conclusions I have reached. What is required of an account of divine action
if it is to be considered a potential explanation of some state of affairs? In
Chapter 3, I described the fi rst condition that such a proposed explanation
must meet. It must do more than posit the mere existence of a creator God
(3.2.3). Such a posit fails to single out the fact to be explained, since on the
theistic hypothesis whatever occurred would happen because God willed it.
If a proposed theistic explanation is to have any signifi cant degree of empirical
content, it must view the explanandum as a means towards a divinelywilled
end. It must posit the existence of a particular divine intention. A
second condition has to do with the coherence of theism (3.3). We need to
have some confi dence that the theistic hypothesis does not embody hidden