Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

Notes 179
15. Hume, “Dialogues,” xi (107; emphasis original).
16. Sober, “Design Argument,” 41.
17. Sober, “Intelligent Design,” 75.
18. Gould, The Panda’s Thumb, 21.
19. Ibid., 20–21.
20. Sober, “Design Argument,” 43.
21. Kenny, God of the Philosophers, 10.
22. Danto, “Basic Actions,” 142. As we have seen (4.3.3.1), this raises a new
question for the theist to answer. A theistic explanation, I have argued (3.2.3),
views the explanandum as the means towards a divinely-willed end. But why
should God choose any means, if he could bring about that end directly?
23. Oppy, “Hume,” 522; Hume, “Dialogues”, xi (111).
24. Darwin, Origin of Species, Chap. 13 (430).
25. Ibid., 432.
26. Pigliucci, “Design Yes, “Intelligent No,” 38.
27. Grayling, “Bolus of Nonsense,” para. 6.
28. Nelson, “Role of Theology,” 504–5.
29. Darwin, Origin of Species, Chap. 6 (217); Chap. 14 (453).
30. Garcia, “Divine Freedom and Creation,” 212.
31. If we understand the character of an agent to be a product of her habitual
pro attitudes (or desires) and her habitual strength or weakness of will
(Appendix 3.2).
32. The best known example is J. L. Mackie’s 1955 article, “Evil and Omnipotence,”
which argues (against the free will defence) that God could have created
free beings who always (freely) chose the good.
33. My optimality condition could be understood as an expression of Hume’s
principle, recently defended by John Beaudoin, that we should never ascribe
to a cause “any qualities, but what are exactly suffi cient to produce the
effect” (“Enquiry,” §105 [136]). It is presumably this principle that Swinburne
has in mind, when he argues that the hypothesis of an infi nite deity is
“simpler” than that of a fi nite deity (Existence of God, pp. 97–98). In any
case, the application of this principle is complicated by the possibility of a
divine revelation. Let’s say, for instance, that the explanandum is a set of
sacred writings, and that we come to the conclusion that the best explanation
of such writings is that they are inspired by God. (Muslim apologists
regularly offer such arguments on behalf of the Qur’an.) Then the writings
in question could tell us things about God which go far beyond what would
be required to explain their existence. They could tell us, for instance, that
he is a being whose powers are without limit.
34. Again, I am reminded of the late Sidney Morgenbesser, who once described
the paradigmatic form of “Jewish logic” (particularly appropriate in this
context) as “If P, why not Q?”
35. Garcia, “Divine Freedom and Creation,” 212.
36. Morris, “Perfection and Creation,” 236.
37. Ibid., 236–37.
38. Ibid., 237.
39. Garcia, “Divine Freedom and Creation,” 200.
40. Morris, “Perfection and Creation,” 237. Morris is here citing an argument
proposed by Norman Kretzmann, who also offers a response. But Kretzmann’s
response is not an adequate one, as Morris demonstrates. Morris’s
own response is to deny that God is obliged by his moral perfection to create
a better world. So it resembles the fi rst objection I have discussed.
41. Garcia, “Divine Freedom and Creation,” 203.
42. Rowe, Can God Be Free?, 89.