Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

148 Appendix
German and a Berliner, then all the corresponding interpretive schemes
become applicable to him. 1
In this situation, Ratcliffe argues, the man’s behaviour is entirely explicable
without attributing to him any mental states such as beliefs, desires,
and intentions.
There is much in Ratcliffe’s analysis that is worthy of discussion. It is not
clear that an explanation by reference to social norms would be a causal
explanation, 2 but there can be little doubt that we often understand the
actions of others by reference to such norms. Indeed, I have already argued
that his account provides a further reason to be sceptical of proposed theistic
explanations, since in the case of such proposed explanations we cannot
appeal to shared social norms or anything analogous to them (7.6.3). All
we can do in the case of a posited divine agent is to attribute to that agent
certain beliefs and desires and to see what explanatory force this attribution
would offer. But precisely for this reason, I have restricted myself to
a traditional folk-psychological account of intentional explanations. There
may be other factors that enter into the explanation of human behaviour,
but it is the folk-psychological account that offers the most helpful way of
thinking about proposed theistic explanations.
A.1 ACTIONS, REASONS, AND CAUSES
The starting point for much of the contemporary discussion has been Donald
Davidson’s 1963 paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” That paper begins
by discussing what it means for something to be a reason for an action. It
goes on to discuss whether a reason is also a cause. Davidson answers these
question by defending two theses, which following G. F. Schueler I shall refer
to as the “belief-desire” thesis (BD) and the “causal thesis” (CT). 3
BD: R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under
the description d only if R consists of a pro attitude of the agent
towards actions with a certain property, and a belief of that agent that
A, under the description d, has that property. 4
CT: A primary reason for an action is its cause. 5
It is the second (causal) thesis that is the particular focus of Davidson’s
attention and much of his paper responds to objections to it. So what are
we to make of these two theses? Are they defensible?
A.1.1 The Causal Thesis
While Davidson’s second, causal thesis has been the subject of some debate, 6
I have no quarrel with it. I have already touched on the diffi culties that