Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

Potential Theistic Explanations 95
good. But that may be only because there is a contradiction here which we
have not yet discovered.
Here’s one response to this objection. In claiming to possess modal
knowledge, we are not claiming to possess incorrigible modal knowledge.
Our judgements in this respect are fallible, like all other judgements regarding
matters of fact. But they are judgements, however provisional, which we
are required to make if we are to evaluate proposed theistic explanations
(5.2–5.3). Indeed they are judgements we are required to make if we are
to offer theistic explanations (5.4.3.2). This initial response is surely correct,
but it fails fully to come to terms with the question. For what is being
suggested here is that we cannot have even corrigible knowledge, or make
provisional judgements, in this area. It is this stronger objection that I am
describing as “modal scepticism.”
5.4.3.1 Modal and Theological Scepticism
The term “modal scepticism” seems to have been coined by Peter van Inwagen,
who deploys it principally in response to the atheist’s argument from
evil. Van Inwagen denies that we can make reliable, intuitive judgements
about what is possible in “circumstances remote from the practical business
of everyday life.” 44 A good case can be made for the reliability of certain
everyday modal judgements. We know, for instance, that the table placed
under the window could have been placed a metre to the left. Experience
shows that we are often successful in making such judgements. But why
should we assume that our capacity for modal judgements goes beyond
these everyday matters? Our supposed ability to make such judgements
may be no more reliable than a supposed ability to judge by eye the distance
of the moon from the earth. 45 We simply cannot do it, and if we think we
can, we are fooling ourselves.
It should be clear that van Inwagen’s modal scepticism entails a particular
form of theological scepticism. It entails a scepticism regarding our
knowledge of the possibilities available to a divine agent. After all, judgements
about how God could act are, of all judgements, the most “remote
from common life and experience.” 46 If the modal sceptic is correct, we are
in no position to know what kind of a world an omnipotent, omniscient,
and morally perfect God would create. I have been assuming that we can
identify various ways in which God might have acted, and that we can
judge some to be better than others. But if the modal sceptic is correct, we
simply cannot do this, for we do not know the possible courses of action
that were open to God. So we cannot say what an optimal (or even a better)
means of achieving a divine goal would look like.
5.4.3.2 The Implications of Modal Scepticism
There is much to be said for a moderate dose of modal scepticism. It is
surely true that our ability to make such judgements is limited. (I have