Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

174 Notes
argues that the question is simply muddled, that we are misled by the fact
that “nothing” is a substantive into thinking that it is a possible state of
affairs (Rundle, Why there is Something rather than Nothing, 113). But I am
not seeking to resolve these questions here.
42. I am reminded of Sidney Morgenbesser’s response to Leibniz’s question,
namely, “If there were nothing, you’d still be complaining!”
43. Swinburne (Existence of God, 151) is among those theists who try to answer
this question.
44. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” 4.
45. Swinburne, The Christian God, 161.
46. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a 3.7; 1a 13.4.
47. Hughes, Nature of God, 51.
48. Hume, “Dialogues,” iv (61).
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? 47.
52. Alston, “Speaking Literally of God,” 365.
53. Schoen, Religious Explanations, 93.
54. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a 13.5.
55. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 1.32.
56. Ibid., 1.14.
57. Ibid., 1.29.
58. Alston, “Speaking Literally of God,” 365.
59. Ibid., 365–66.
60. Ibid., 366.
61. Ibid., 369.
62. Mascall, Existence and Analogy, 101–4.
63. Ibid., 113.
64. Swinburne, Existence of God, 62.
65. What is it like to be a cat? No one knows. But that doesn’t prevent us from
explaining a cat’s actions intentionally. Perhaps if a cat could speak, we could
understand it. Its form of life is not so radically different from our own.
66. This objection goes back at least as far as David Hume (“Dialogues,” iv [61])
and it has been much discussed since. For a concise, recent statement of this
argument against divine eternity and immutability, see Hoffman and Rosenkrantz,
The Divine Attributes, 103–4. Swinburne (Coherence of Theism,
223–29) argues against the doctrine of divine eternity, and rejects a strong
version of the doctrine of immutability, on similar grounds. For an opposing
view, see Leftow, Time and Eternity, 295–97.
67. The theist could argue that God’s inability to know certain future states of
affairs does not compromise his omniscience, since there is no fact of the
matter about what has not yet occurred. For a discussion of this option, see
Swinburne, Coherence of Theism, 179–80. For a survey of other responses,
see Helm, Eternal God, Chap. 7 (109–25).
68. Helm, Eternal God, 124.
69. Martin, Atheism, Chap. 12 (286–316).
70. Swinburne, Coherence of Theism, 71–73.
71. Swinburne, Coherence of Theism, 73 (cf. 306).
72. The principle is abandoned by advocates of paraconsistent logic, for reasons
not unrelated to a point I am about to make (3.3.4). But let me restrict myself
to classical logic for the moment.
73. This same point could be made by discussing how we might falsify our
hypothesis, for although you cannot verify a hypothesis by deductive reasoning,
you can falsify it (Popper, Logic of Scientifi c Discovery, §23 [71]). You
can validly argue “if H, then not-E, E, therefore not-H.” Now if E represents