Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

70 Theism and Explanation
In principle, a theist could argue in this way. But it is diffi cult to see
how he could convince a non-believer. For any intentional description of
the fact will seem question-begging to the atheist. The diffi culty here is
related to the one I mentioned earlier (3.2.2)—the fact that a theistic explanation
posits the very existence of the agent to whom some intentions are
being attributed. In everyday life, we already have good reason to believe
that the agent in question exists and that at least some of his behaviour is
intentional. We are all agreed that at least some of his behaviour has a true
intentional description, even if we do not know just what that description
is. But in the case of a proposed theistic explanation, what is in dispute is
the very existence of the alleged agent. In other words, the atheist will see
no reason to agree that any of these facts has a true intentional description.
So it is understandable that in practice theists should begin with facts
which (in their view) can be explained in no other way.
4.3.3.2 Facts With Contested Natural Explanations
Our fi nal class of explananda consists of facts which have what the atheist
regards as a successful natural explanation, although it is one that the
theist contests. The clearest contemporary example of such an attitude is to
be found among creationists, who reject Darwin’s account of the development
of biological species. On what basis do theists reject proposed natural
explanations? Well, a theistic argument against a proposed natural explanation
could take one of two forms, which mirror the atheist’s arguments
against proposed theistic explanations of which I wrote earlier (1.3). They
could be de facto or in principle arguments.
In the fi rst case, that of a de facto argument, the theist would argue that,
yes, there does exist a potential natural explanation of the facts in question,
one that makes no reference to God. But the theistic explanation is simply a
better one. It is more consistent with the rest of our knowledge, has greater
empirical content, and is simpler, more economical, and more informative.
It is worth noting that while theists could argue in this way, in practice they
rarely do, for reasons that will become clear in Chapter 7. (Proposed theistic
explanations, I shall argue, necessarily lack many of these qualities.)
The more common argument against natural explanations is an in principle
one: it denies that the natural explanation in question is even a potential
explanation. This is the case among creationists, who generally argue that
Darwin’s theory simply cannot explain the diversity of biological species.
Here, of course, the atheist may simply reply that they are wrong.
One exception to this rule is Richard Swinburne, in his discussion of
the so-called “fi ne-tuning” argument. 40 The fi ne-tuning argument takes as
its starting point the idea that only a narrow range of initial conditions
would make possible the emergence of beings such as ourselves. And it is
highly unlikely that they should have the particular values they have by
chance. It follows that the universe in which we live appears “fi ne-tuned”