Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

Against Religious Explanations 13
Methodological naturalism, as it appears in science, is based on an
inductive generalization derived from 300 to 400 years of scientifi c
experience. Time and time again, scientists have considered hypotheses
about occult entities ranging from souls, to spirits, to occult magical
powers, to astrological infl uences, to psychic powers, ESP, and so on.
Time and time again such hypotheses have been rejected, not because
of philosophical bias, but because when examined carefully there
was not a shred of good evidence to support them. Scientists are allowed,
like anyone else, to learn from experience. . . . The experience is
straightforward. We keep smacking into nature, whereas the denizens
of the supernatural and paranormal realms somehow manage to elude
careful analysis of data. 65
Once again, this is a de facto rather than an in principle objection. Indeed
Shanks is apparently prepared to concede the possibility of what he calls
“supernatural science.” 66 The explanations it offers might be prompted by
faith, but they would be supported by evidence. 67 He illustrates this possibility
by discussing the (largely inconclusive) “prayer trials”—clinical trials
of the effi cacy of intercessory prayer in medicine—to which I myself shall
make reference later (4.2.2).
This de facto objection to religious explanations is a modest position,
which is not diffi cult to defend. There is no doubt that across a variety of
fi elds, religious explanations have been replaced by those invoking only
natural causes (7.3). But to many opponents of religious explanations, the
de facto objection seems inadequate. Applied to the debate about scientifi c
naturalism, it justifi es a provisional exclusion of religious explanations from
the sciences, but it cannot guarantee that this exclusion will be permanent.
It cannot prevent people from offering religious explanations and insisting
that we take them seriously. So some opponents of religious explanations
have adopted a more uncompromising position. In John Earman’s words,
they have tried to fi nd a “silver bullet” which will “put a merciful end to all
the nonsense.” 68 The most promising candidate for a silver bullet would be
a demonstration that even if a proposition about divine action were true,
it would fail to explain. It would fail to meet some condition that must be
met by any successful explanation. I shall refer to this as the in principle
objection to religious explanations.
1.3.2 An In Principle Objection
We fi nd hints of an in principle objection to religious explanations in the
published work of Charles Darwin. At one point in the Origin of Species,
for instance, Darwin suggests that to appeal to a divine plan—to what
today would be called “intelligent design”—does not in fact explain anything.
In speaking of “the plan of creation,” we may think we are giving an