Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

48 Theism and Explanation
So there must be some respect in which creatures resemble their creator.
But while this means that at least some of the language used of creatures is
applicable to God, it also means that it is applicable only when used in an
extended or analogical sense.
This traditional doctrine regarding theological language requires some
explication. It is not the case that all our language about God is analogical.
For, as Aquinas’s own words suggest, we can use certain negative predicates
of God in their literal sense. As William Alston writes, God is literally
“incorporeal,” “immutable,” and “not-identical-with-Richard-Nixon.” 58
And one could argue that there are “extrinsic” predicates (such as “thought
of now by me”) that can also be predicated of God in a literal way. 59 So presumably
what Aquinas is referring to are “intrinsic” predicates: those that
tell us something about “the nature and operations of the subject.” 60 As
Aquinas suggests, if we cannot predicate these of God in any literal way, it
is presumably because we cannot form precise concepts of the divine properties
to which they refer. 61 It follows that we can apply intrinsic predicates
to God only by using language in a metaphorical or analogical manner.
If I were to pursue this line of thought, I would need to identify the different
ways in which we can speak of things analogically, 62 and decide which
of these would allow us to speak of God. 63 Once again, however, such a
discussion would take me far beyond the scope of my study. The only issue
I wish to address here is whether this common theological doctrine—the
idea that we can speak of God only by analogy—undermines the force of a
proposed theistic explanation.
A moment’s refl ection suggests that it does not, for we already have
apparently successful explanations that use analogical terms. In explaining
the behaviour of non-human animals we often use terms such as “belief”
and “desire,” while recognising that the referents of those terms must be
very different from the beliefs and desires with which we are familiar. 64
When my cat wanders into the kitchen and sits by the fridge, it seems reasonable
to explain his action by saying that he “desires” a saucer of milk
and “believes” that it is to be found in the fridge. Yet we know the feline
mental states corresponding to these terms must be very different from the
corresponding mental states in human beings. 65 A more sophisticated feline
psychology would perhaps use different terms (3.2.2); to say that the cat
“desires” milk is to use a human folk-psychological term in reference to a
cats. But the mere fact that language is being used analogically does not
undermine its explanatory use. Such language can still be informative and
could, in principle, form the basis of a successful explanation.
3.3.2 The Concept of God
The more serious issue here has to do with the internal coherence or consistency
of the theistic conception of God. Could the various attributes which
theists attribute to God co-exist in the one being? Could he be an intentional