Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

68 Theism and Explanation
as we have seen (4.3.1), many theists do reject occasionalism, and it is their
views in which I am interested here. Examples of explanations of this kind
are not hard to fi nd. When the biblical prophets affi rm that God brought
about the destruction of Jerusalem in 586 bc to punish Israel, they are
not affi rming that no natural explanation could be offered of this event.
Indeed, they implicitly concede that such an explanation is possible. The
prophet Jeremiah, for instance, criticises the political alliances of the kings
of Judea with Egypt, which brought down upon the Jewish state the wrath
of the Babylonians. There is nothing supernatural, nothing miraculous (if
you like) about the result that followed. It is a fact that has a natural explanation,
one the biblical writers do not dispute. What they offer is a complementary
explanation, one that appeals to divine action.
Are theistic explanations redundant? But if this is what the theist is doing,
he must face an obvious objection: that of explanatory redundancy. If we
already have a natural explanation of the fact in question, which no one is
contesting, why offer a theistic one? The problem here is to be distinguished
from the well-known issue of causal overdetermination. In the case of causal
overdetermination we have two factors, either of which is suffi cient to bring
about the effect. But neither is necessary, since even if one were not present,
the other would ensure that the same outcome occurred. 34 (A man is shot
by two assassins and dies. Either shot is suffi cient for his death to occur,
but neither is necessary.) The case of a theistic explanation of a naturally
explained fact is different, since the natural cause is thought to be dependent
on the divine cause. Ex hypothesi, if God had not willed the destruction
of Jerusalem, the Babylonians would not have destroyed it. God’s willing
of the event is a necessary condition of its occurrence, for it is a necessary
condition of the occurrence of the event that was the secondary cause. But
of course God’s willing of the event is also a suffi cient condition of is occurrence,
for as we have seen (3.4.2), the divine will is unfailingly effi cacious.
At this point, we seem to have a new kind of explanatory redundancy,
except that it is now the natural explanation that appears to be redundant
(3.4.4). (Once again, we can see why some theists adopt the occasionalist
view.) On the theistic hypothesis, what role do natural causes play in a
case such as this? Apparently, natural causes are thought to be the means
by which God achieves his goals. (In the case of the biblical example, the
natural cause of the disaster was the means by which he punished Israel.)
But why should God choose any means, if he could bring about this result
directly, as a basic action? If God wanted to punish sinners on Boxing Day
2004, why use a tsunami? Not only is this—from God’s point of view—an
unnecessary means; it is also an indiscriminate one, and so hardly the best
means (5.3). Why could God not simply will that sinners experience suffering,
and that non-sinners do not? Presumably we would soon make the
connection, and learn our lesson. This is, of course, an excellent question.
If a proposed theistic explanation is to be even a potential explanation, it