Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

What Would They Explain? 69
must offer an answer. It must tell us why God would choose any created
cause, let alone this one, as the means of achieving his goals.
Let me set these issues aside for the moment. If theistic explanations are
intentional explanations, the charge of explanatory redundancy is perhaps
not as serious as it might appear. For in the case of intentional explanations,
there does seem to be a sense in which one can offer two explanations
of the same fact. An intentional explanation tells us of what the agent was
trying to achieve in performing this action. A natural-scientifi c explanation
describes the mechanism that brought about the action. Neither explanation
would be complete, 35 in the sense that each approach “leaves some
explanation-seeking questions unanswered.” 36 But as I have argued above
(1.3.3), an incomplete explanation is still an explanation. 37 This is, in fact,
the solution adopted by Richard Swinburne. As Swinburne writes, “the
motion of my hand may be . . . explained by goings-on in the nerves and
muscles of my arm, and physiological laws. It may also be . . . explained by
me bringing it about, having the intention and power to do so.” 38 Assuming
that the motion in question was an intentional act, this seems correct. Each
explanation is telling us something different about the event.
Explaining under a description. But to show that intentional and non-intentional
explanations can be complementary is not yet to escape the charge of
explanatory redundancy. The events I am discussing here are those that have
an accepted natural explanation. The question the atheist can pose to the
theist is this: If you accept the natural (perhaps non-intentional) explanation,
why do you want to offer an intentional explanation as well? What we need to
remember here is that any fact is explained only under a particular description
(3.2.2). What the physiological explanation explains is why my hand moved;
it does not purport to explain why I moved my hand. 39 So to say that a fact
already has a successful natural explanation is to say that there exists some
description of that fact under which it can be explained in non-intentional
terms. So if the theist wishes to argue that the same event requires a complementary,
intentional explanation, she must show that there exists another true
description of the event that requires this new kind of explanation.
If this is correct, it does have a surprising implication. When setting out
to prove the existence of God, theists generally begin with facts whose natural
explanation they reject. They may be naturally inexplicable (4.3.2.2)
or merely naturally unexplained facts (4.3.2.1), or they may be facts whose
natural explanation the theist contests (4.3.3.2). But on my account, they
are under no obligation to do so. A theist could, in principle, begin with a
fact that has a natural explanation, one he does not contest. He could admit
that there exists a true description of this fact—analogous to “why my hand
moved”—under which it can be explained without (immediate) reference to
God. But he could seek to show that there exists another true description of
this fact—analogous to “why I moved my hand”—that demands an intentional,
theistic explanation.