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What are Theistic Explanations? 51 acting rationally in accepting an apparently inconsistent hypothesis? Most philosophers would hold that we are not entitled to believe such a theory, which would be equivalent to believing a contradiction. 74 But perhaps we can accept an apparently inconsistent hypothesis, even if we do not believe it (2.1.3). If it enjoys other explanatory virtues—such as a high degree of testability, simplicity, ontological economy, and informativeness—we might accept it in the sense of continuing to work on it, to see if the apparent inconsistencies can be resolved. As Alan Musgrave remarks, “unless we are allowed to work with logically inconsistent theories, how will they ever get turned into consistent ones?” 75 (This might entail abandoning the principle that ex contradictione quodlibet, but a number of logicians have advocated precisely this move.) So from this point of view, Swinburne’s proposal is not as objectionable as it might appear at fi rst sight. We could legitimately adopt a theistic hypothesis, in some provisional, heuristic way, even if there were some prima facie evidence that it was internally incoherent. We could do so if it possessed other explanatory virtues. How likely is it that a theistic hypothesis would possess those explanatory virtues? Once again that’s a question I shall address later. 3.4 CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS I have been arguing that a proposed theistic explanation is an intentional explanation. But theistic explanations are also, it appears, causal explanations. The God whose existence and action they posit is a creator God, who brings things into existence by an act of the divine will. But can these two things be combined? Are intentional explanations causal explanations? And can we make any sense of the idea that the will of God has causal effi - cacy? Is the idea of a creator God a coherent one? 3.4.1 Intentional and Causal Explanations A fi rst objection rests on the very character of intentional explanations. It suggests that a theistic explanation could not be both intentional and causal, since these represent distinct and mutually exclusive forms of explanation. No intentional explanation is a causal explanation. But I believe this claim to be wrong, for reasons I shall outline later (Appendix 1.1). I have no argument with the idea, defended by Donald Davidson, that intentions are causes and that intentional explanations are also causal explanations. 76 There is one issue that needs to be clarifi ed here. I have suggested that intentional explanations are not nomological (3.2.1). They do, if you like, depend on something resembling a law, namely the rationality principle. But they do not depend on law-like generalisations linking particular intentions and particular actions. Does this mean that they cannot be regarded as causal explanations? Only if you believe that the citing of causal laws is
52 Theism and Explanation a necessary condition of a causal explanation. But I shall argue later that it is not (Appendix 3.3.1), that causal explanations do not necessarily involve causal laws. 77 If this is true, then there is no diffi culty with the idea that an intentional explanation is also a causal explanation. 3.4.2 Intermediate Causal Mechanisms But a different objection may be raised, one that suggests that even if intentional explanations in general can be causal explanations, proposed theistic explanations cannot. They fail to be causal explanations—or, at least, adequate causal explanations—because they say nothing about the mechanism of divine action. Adolf Grünbaum articulates this objection, arguing that the hypothesis of divine creation does not even envision, let alone specify an appropriate intermediate causal process that would link the presence of the supposed divine (causal) agency to the effects that are attributed to it. Nor, it seems is there any prospect at all that the chronic inscrutability of the putative causal linkage will be removed by new theoretical developments. 78 It is diffi cult to know what to make of this objection. It is of the essence of the theistic hypothesis that God can bring about events and states of affairs directly, without any intermediate causal process. Ex hypothesi, God could (if he chose) bring about any effect merely by willing it, as a basic action. 79 Indeed given the traditional concept of God, the divine will is unfailingly effi cacious. We cannot conceive of a situation in which God wills some state of affairs and it fails to come about. Of course, one might argue that positing the existence of such a being—one possessed of “magical” powers—is extravagant, in the sense that it is not warranted by the evidence. One might also point out that we know of no other causal process of this type (7.2). But it is no objection to the idea of divine action, the idea that the will of God could bring about some state of affairs. In fact, taken at face value, Grünbaum’s argument leads to an infi nite regress of causal attributions. What it appears to be saying is that if we claim that A causes B, we must be able to specify an “intermediate causal process” that links A and B. Let’s call this intermediate causal process A 1 . A → A 1 → B But is A 1 itself a cause? Then its causal relationship to B (for example) requires a further intermediate causal mechanism, namely A 2 . A → A 1 → A 2 → B
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Theism and Explanation
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Theism and Explanation Gregory W. D
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To Anna who never tires of asking
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Acknowledgements My thanks are due
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6 Inference to the Best Explanation
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Inference to the Best Explanation 1
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7 Successful Theistic Explanations
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Successful Theistic Explanations 11
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8 Conclusion Miss Binney spoke as i
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Conclusion 145 explanation that met
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Appendix Intentional Explanations M
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Appendix 149 attend any discussion
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Appendix 151 explanation is a causa
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Appendix 153 we assume is a “myth
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Appendix 155 Will this suffi ce as
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Appendix 157 reasoning, Schueler su
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Appendix 159 action, one that has a
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Appendix 161 estimate of her charac
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Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
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Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
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Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers
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Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
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Notes 171 19. Musgrave, “Scientif
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Notes 173 the most explicit in its
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Notes 175 any true proposition, the
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Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
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Notes 179 15. Hume, “Dialogues,
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Notes 181 19. Swinburne, Is There a
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Notes 183 it will also confi rm H 2
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Notes 185 91. I am grateful to Geor
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Notes 187 this be a fatal objection
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Notes 189 71. Lakatos, “Falsifi c
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192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
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194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
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196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
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198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
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200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
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Index A abduction: and induction, 1
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defences, and theodicies, 134-35 de
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intelligent design theory: argument
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preemption, causal. See causal pree
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tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
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