Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

184 Notes
50. Swinburne, Existence of God, 53.
51. Ibid., 65.
52. Ibid., 64.
53. Ibid., 60. Note that Swinburne’s defi nition of background knowledge effectively
restricts it to observational evidence. By excluding our best theories,
Swinburne signifi cantly (and conveniently) narrows its scope.
54. Swinburne, Existence of God, 146.
55. Ibid., 65–66.
56. Ibid., 16.
57. Ibid., 17.
58. Sobel, “Probabilities, Subjective and Objective,” 9.
59. Swinburne, Existence of God, 71.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., 112–31.
62. Musgrave, “Kuhn’s Second Thoughts,” 292.
63. Ibid., 290.
64. Bartholomew, “Lyell and Evolution,” 294.
65. Ibid., 294–95.
66. Draper, “God, Science, and Naturalism,” 295–96.
67. Carrier, “Argument from Biogenesis,” 742.
68. Prevost, “Swinburne, Mackie and Bayes’s Theorem,” 181.
69. Swinburne, Existence of God, 53.
70. Mackie, Miracle of Theism, 100.
71. Swinburne, Existence of God, 97.
72. Swinburne, The Christian God, 160.
73. Hume, “Dialogues,” iv (61); Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature?, 47.
74. Banner, Justifi cation of Science, 152–53.
75. Popper, Logic of Scientifi c Discovery, §43 (126–28).
76. Thagard, “The Best Explanation,” 186.
77. Ibid., 184. As Thagard notes, auxiliary hypotheses, introduced in an ad hoc
manner, do not detract from simplicity if they are themselves corroborated,
if they help to explain new facts, or are “shared by competing theories.”
78. Popper, Logic of Scientifi c Discovery, §46 (131).
79. Van Inwagen, “Problem of Evil,” 162 n. 6.
80. Draper, “Pain and Pleasure,” 332.
81. Van Inwagen, “Problem of Evil,” 151.
82. Ibid., 139–40; Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil, 28.
83. Van Inwagen, “Problem of Evil,” 140–43. Van Inwagen speaks of an historian
defending the character of Richard III, but I have transposed it into that
of a lawyer defending a client, to make his point clearer.
84. I have already suggested (5.4.3.2) that such scepticism undermines the theist’s
explanatory claims as much as the atheist’s argument from evil. But
that’s not the point I’m making here.
85. Van Inwagen, “Problem of Evil,”136. In fact, van Inwagen offers two parallel
arguments, but I shall examine just the fi rst, since the issues raised by
the second are no different.
86. Van Inwagen, “Problem of Evil,”153.
87. Ibid., 155.
88. Ibid., 139.
89. Would it suffi ce to show that the auxiliary hypothesis is likely, given the
central hypothesis? Would it be enough to show that if theism were true, the
proposed scenario is plausible (ibid., 139). Well, it would help. But the atomist’s
spike hypothesis doesn’t seem to have even this much in its favour.
90. Ibid., 153.