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Conclusion 145 explanation that met the standards I have outlined. Any adequate explanation deserves, ipso facto, to be classed as scientifi c. But if you want to adopt a narrower defi nition of the “scientifi c,” and argue that a successful theistic explanation would be a satisfactory explanation, but not a scientifi c one, then this is merely a dispute about words. The important philosophical question we should ask of any proposed explanation is not, “Does this invoke a supernatural agent?” The important question is, “Is it a satisfactory explanation?” A Quinean naturalist might hold that (in the words of Susan Haack) “the only means we have of fi guring out what the world is like, is our experience of the world and our explanatory theorizing about it.” 1 The question then becomes whether our “explanatory theorizing” could include reference to a divine agent. As should be clear by now, I have no argument with a naturalism of this kind. Indeed, my argument has presupposed it. My only qualifi cation is that I see no reason to call such a position “naturalistic.” But the naturalism with which I began, the methodological naturalism of the sciences, is of a different kind. This entails something closely resembling an ontological claim. More precisely, it is a procedural rule which demands that in offering explanations we should posit only natural entities, however those are defi ned. Such a rule would certainly exclude proposed theistic explanations. (It would exclude other kinds of proposed explanations as well, but it would certainly exclude theistic ones.) It is this kind of naturalism that is invoked and defended by many of the opponents of intelligent design theory. Does my analysis lend it any support? If methodological naturalism is taken to mean that no proposed theistic explanation could ever have any explanatory force, then no, my analysis does not support this conclusion. Such a claim would correspond to a general in principle objection, one which applies to all proposed theistic explanations. It would hold that for any statement about divine agency, there could exist no fact of which it would be even a potential explanation. Such a sweeping dismissal, I have argued, cannot be justifi ed. What my analysis suggests is that if we want to argue that proposed theistic explanations lack explanatory force, we need to do so on case-by-case basis, by showing (for instance) that a proposed theistic explanation fails to meet the optimality condition. We would need to show that for this particular statement about divine agency, then even if it were true, it would not explain the particular explanandum to which it is being applied. Or even if it would, the proposed explanation would be less than satisfactory on other grounds. It might (for instance) be formulated in a way that lacks empirical content or lacks corroboration by independent tests. I am confi dent that such arguments would be often, if not always, decisive. But a sweeping, in principle dismissal of proposed theistic explanations is unwarranted. What about a more modest methodological naturalism? My analysis does support the view that we ought to have a preference for natural explanations, since these have a better chance of exhibiting the features that
146 Theism and Explanation characterise an adequate explanation. But this is a very modest position. After all, none of the features I have discussed—testability, consistency with background knowledge, simplicity, ontological economy, and informativeness—rule out proposed theistic explanations a priori. A proposed theistic explanation formulated with the requisite degree of intentional specifi city would be testable (7.1.1). Whether it survives the test is another question, but it is not a question which we can decide in advance. Consistency with background knowledge is a contingent matter: if we already had a tradition of successful theistic explanations, then there would be no reason to reject yet another. Ontological economy is a ceteris paribus condition. It suggests that we should not posit new kinds of entities unless these are required and it is at least conceivable that positing a divine agent might be required, to explain some phenomenon. And while a proposed theistic explanation may not be a “lovely explanation,” which would allow us to deduce the precise details of the effect, this does not seem (by itself) a fatal objection, if it were to score highly on our other criteria. So yes, my arguments might give us reason to prefer natural explanations when these are available, and to seek natural explanations when they are not. It follows that a proposed theistic explanation should be, at best, an explanation of last resort. 2 One might argue that this view—that we should abandon the search for natural explanations only in extremis— represents a kind of “presumption of naturalism.” And so it does. But my point is that such a presumption would be (in principle) defeasible. And it falls short of what most people mean by the “methodological naturalism” of the sciences. My own view is that the naturalistic research tradition of the sciences has been stunningly successful and must rank as of one of the greatest of human achievements. But I think it is poorly served by attempts to defi ne science in such a way as to exclude the supernatural. The debate over intelligent design is instructive in this regard. One might win a legal victory by insisting that this proposed theistic explanation is not what we customarily call “science.” And this is true, for contingent historical reasons. But it would be much more effective to show that this particular proposed theistic explanation, with its deliberately vague appeal to an unspecifi ed “designer,” is practically vacuous. It lacks the fi rst and most important virtue of any proposed explanation, namely that of testability. It follows that this particular proposed theistic explanation should be rejected. Could the theist produce a better one? I doubt it, but then it would be most regrettable if we were to forbid him to try. Nothing could be more antithetical to the spirit of free enquiry than this kind of censorship. If proposed theistic explanations are to be defeated, as they have been so often in the past, it will be by way of the free contest of ideas. The contribution which I hope this study has made is to show how this could be done, by outlining the standards against which any proposed theistic explanation should be measured.
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Theism and Explanation
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Theism and Explanation Gregory W. D
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To Anna who never tires of asking
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Acknowledgements My thanks are due
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2 Theism and Explanation Could it m
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6 Theism and Explanation experiment
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16 Theism and Explanation God creat
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On Explanations in General 21 of ou
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On Explanations in General 23 merel
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Figure 2.2 Swinburne’s conception
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On Explanations in General 27 simil
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On Explanations in General 29 condi
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On Explanations in General 31 could
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3 What are Theistic Explanations? I
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What are Theistic Explanations? 35
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3.2.2 Positing a Divine Agent What
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4 What Would They Explain? It’s a
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4.2 SINGULAR AND GENERAL EXPLANATIO
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What Would They Explain? 63 shelter
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What Would They Explain? 65 were we
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What Would They Explain? 67 not des
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What Would They Explain? 69 must of
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What Would They Explain? 71 to prod
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What Would They Explain? 73 There i
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What Would They Explain? 75 how mig
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78 Theism and Explanation contradic
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80 Theism and Explanation low—tha
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82 Theism and Explanation 5.1.3 Is
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84 Theism and Explanation eye. But
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86 Theism and Explanation If we acc
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88 Theism and Explanation Why not,
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90 Theism and Explanation directly,
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92 Theism and Explanation of divers
Page 105 and 106: 94 Theism and Explanation there can
Page 107 and 108: 96 Theism and Explanation already c
Page 109 and 110: 98 Theism and Explanation (2.1.2) t
Page 112 and 113: 6 Inference to the Best Explanation
Page 114 and 115: Inference to the Best Explanation 1
Page 126 and 127: 7 Successful Theistic Explanations
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Page 154 and 155: 8 Conclusion Miss Binney spoke as i
Page 158 and 159: Appendix Intentional Explanations M
Page 160 and 161: Appendix 149 attend any discussion
Page 162 and 163: Appendix 151 explanation is a causa
Page 164 and 165: Appendix 153 we assume is a “myth
Page 166 and 167: Appendix 155 Will this suffi ce as
Page 168 and 169: Appendix 157 reasoning, Schueler su
Page 170 and 171: Appendix 159 action, one that has a
Page 172 and 173: Appendix 161 estimate of her charac
Page 174 and 175: Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
Page 176 and 177: Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
Page 178 and 179: Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers
Page 180 and 181: Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
Page 182 and 183: Notes 171 19. Musgrave, “Scientif
Page 184 and 185: Notes 173 the most explicit in its
Page 186 and 187: Notes 175 any true proposition, the
Page 188 and 189: Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
Page 190 and 191: Notes 179 15. Hume, “Dialogues,
Page 192 and 193: Notes 181 19. Swinburne, Is There a
Page 194 and 195: Notes 183 it will also confi rm H 2
Page 196 and 197: Notes 185 91. I am grateful to Geor
Page 198 and 199: Notes 187 this be a fatal objection
Page 200: Notes 189 71. Lakatos, “Falsifi c
Page 203 and 204: 192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
Page 205 and 206: 194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
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196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
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198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
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200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
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Index A abduction: and induction, 1
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defences, and theodicies, 134-35 de
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intelligent design theory: argument
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preemption, causal. See causal pree
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tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
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