Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

14 Theism and Explanation
explanation, but in reality we are only restating the fact to be explained. 69
But in his unpublished writings, Darwin is more forthright. As early as
1838, he writes that
the explanation of types of structure in classes—as resulting from the
will of the deity, to create animals on certain plans,—is no explanation—it
has not the character of a physical law & is therefore utterly
useless.—it foretells nothing because we know nothing of the will of
the Deity, how it acts & whether constant or inconstant like that of
man.—the cause given we know not the effect. 70
This objection raises some important issues. Whether it is true that, given a
divine cause, “we know not the effect” will be one of the central questions
of the present study (5.1–5.2). And a key issue here is whether all explanations
must depend on laws (Appendix 3.3).
Some of Darwin’s followers took up his in principle objections. In a review
of Darwin’s Origin of Species, Thomas Henry Huxley summarises the
explanatory advantages of Darwin’s theory over that of the special creation
of individual species. But he goes on to add the following qualifi cation.
Suppose for a moment we admit the explanation [special creation], and
then seriously ask ourselves how much the wiser are we; what does
the explanation explain? Is it any more than a grandiloquent way of
announcing the fact, that we really know nothing about the matter? A
phaenomenon is explained when it is shown to be a case of some general
law of Nature; but the supernatural interpos ition of the Creator can,
by the nature of the case, exemplify no law, and if species really have
arisen in this way, it is absurd to attempt to discuss their origin. 71
More recent advocates of in principle objections are not diffi cult to fi nd.
Richard Dawkins, for instance, writes that to explain the machinery of
life “by invoking a supernatural Designer is to explain precisely nothing.”
72 Why? Because it “leaves unexplained the origin of the Designer.” 73
A more sophisticated argument is offered by E. Thomas Lawson and Robert
N. McCauley. They argue that propositions about God are “semantically
anomalous” insofar as they are open to an indefi nite number of
interpretations. 74 This fl exibility allows them to appear to explain any
possible state of affairs. But this is a philosophical vice rather than a virtue.
As they write,
religious models remain undefeated in the face of any contrary experience.
Consequently, they explain nothing at all, since the theory that
explains everything explains nothing. However, because they are incapable
of defeat, they are also consistent with any possible state of
affairs, and this certainly leads to the appearance that they have an