Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

46 Theism and Explanation
nothing?” If we understand this as a question regarding the universe, 41 then
it could be argued that “because God willed it” is all the answer we need.
But I’m not so sure. Even in response to Leibniz’s question, this answer does
not seem to have much content. After all, what we are asking is, why does
the universe exist? Or, as the theist might put it, why is it not the case that
God alone exists? Keep in mind that if there were no universe, then given
God’s existence, he would have willed this state of affairs, too. 42 If God
was free either to create or not to create, what we want to know is why
he created. 43 So even in response to Leibniz’s question, a proposed theistic
explanation needs to say something more than “because God willed it.” It
must spell out why he willed what he did.
3.3 THE COHERENCE OF THEISM
I have been speaking of God’s “reasons,” his “purposes,” his “goals” in
acting as he has. This reminds us of another feature of proposed theistic
explanations. They assume that we can apply the language of intentional
explanations to God, that we can intelligibly speak of God as having beliefs
and desires. Such language seems essential to the theistic hypothesis, which
draws on a kind of “folk theology” similar to the folk psychology upon which
everyday intentional explanations draw. But it is by no means clear that such
language is applicable to God. In what sense could God have such mental
states? Do such terms have any intelligible meaning when applied to God?
3.3.1 Theism and Analogy
It could be argued that such terms are applicable to God, but that some of
them are applicable only in some extended, analogous sense. God could
not have “desires” in our ordinary sense of this term, but he could have
attitudes which in some pertinent way resemble human desires. Perhaps
God could have what Donald Davidson calls “pro attitudes,” 44 even if they
do not include the affective element that we fi nd in beings such as ourselves.
A more precise theology would make this clear. It would, for example,
agree that when the folk speak of God as “angry” they are right to do so.
This word does capture something of the mind of God. But the theologian
would also insist that divine anger is very different from human anger.
The problem here is highlighted by another common theistic doctrine, that
of divine simplicity. As found in Aquinas, this doctrine denies that there is
any real distinction between the instances of the divine properties. 45 God’s
omnipotence, for instance, is identical with his omniscience, and his mercy
identical with his justice. When applied to God, all these names signify just one
divine reality. 46 In Hume’s Dialogues, the fi gure of Demea offers what Gerard
Hughes calls “a pretty fair summary of Aquinas’s view.” 47 “All true theists,”
Demea notes, ascribe to God “perfect immutability and simplicity.” 48