Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

Against Religious Explanations 11
question is not, “Where did it come from?,” but, “Can it be defended? Can
it function as the explanans of a successful explanation?”
Interestingly, Brauer, Forrest, and Gey concede that there are circumstances
in which propositions about the supernatural would be acceptable.
Doubts about the supernatural as a scientifi c explanation would vanish
were [ID advocates] to produce (1) an epistemology for intersubjective
knowledge of the supernatural and (2) a workable methodology for
producing original data and constructing explanations of it. 62
But if we had such an epistemology or methodology—if claims about the
supernatural were intersubjectively testable—then the sole serious objection
to such explanations would be the pragmatic, de facto one, that they
have failed the test and no longer merit our acceptance.
1.3 OBJECTIONS TO RELIGIOUS EXPLANATIONS
What emerges from this discussion? We can see that there are two kinds
of objections to proposed religious explanations, which I shall refer to as
de facto and in principle objections. The weakness of, for instance, Brauer,
Forrest, and Gey’s article is that it fails to distinguish these. So let’s see
what the distinction involves.
1.3.1 A De Facto Objection
A fi rst kind of objection maintains that while propositions about divine
agency might once have been apparently successful explanations, they have
been superseded. Across the sciences, we now have competing natural theories
that are more successful than the old, theological ones. In other words,
religious explanations represent a failed research tradition. They need be
taken no more seriously than accounts of planetary movements derived
from Ptolemaic astronomy. There was a time when Ptolemy’s view of the
cosmos was the best explanation we had of the movements of the heavenly
bodies, but that time has passed. Ptolemaic astronomy has now been superseded
by a more successful explanation, one capable of explaining phenomena
that Ptolemaic astronomy could not. In the same way, the atheist could
concede that religious accounts of the origins of living beings do have some
explanatory force, while arguing that they have been superseded. We now
have natural accounts, such as that offered by Charles Darwin, which we
have more reason to accept. I shall refer to this as the de facto objection to
religious explanations. According to this view, religious explanations are
acceptable in principle—they could have explanatory force—but in fact we
have insuffi cient reason to accept them.
As we have seen (1.2.3), there are hints of this de facto objection in the
work of Brauer, Forrest, and Gey. But let me illustrate it in more detail