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Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers, “Science without God,” 272. 2. Lyell, Principles of Geology, 1.76. 3. Numbers, “Science without God,” 275; Brooke, Science and Religion, 19. As Ron Numbers notes (“Science without God,” 267–69, 280), some even argued for the banishment of God from science on religious grounds. 4. Rudwick, “Introduction,” xxxii; Lyell, Principles of Geology, 2.126. 5. Lyell, Principles of Geology, 2.124. When it comes to the origin of the human species (ibid., 1.156), Lyell all but abandons his famous actualism (or uniformitarianism), in his efforts to highlight the difference in kind between humans and other animals. 6. Numbers, “Science without God,” 279–80. 7. Gillespie, Charles Darwin, 115. 8. Quine, Theories and Things, 21, 67. 9. Quine, “Naturalism,” 252. 10. Ibid. 11. Haack, “The Two Faces of Quine’s Naturalism,” 353. 12. For the suggestion that even a naturalism of this kind involves no ontological claims, being merely methodological, see sect. 1.1.2. 13. Van Inwagen, “What is Naturalism?” 81. 14. Ibid., 79. 15. Ibid., 80. 16. Ibid., 81. 17. Nagel, “Naturalism Reconsidered,” 8. 18. I am grateful to James Maclaurin for these examples. 19. Nagel, “Naturalism Reconsidered,” 8. Paul Draper’s suggestion resembles this (“God, Science, and Naturalism,” 278): nature, he suggests, could be defi ned as “the spatiotemporal universe of physical entities together with any entities that are ontologically or causally reducible to those entities.” 20. Melnyk, “A Physicalist Manifesto,” 2. 21. Kanzian, “Naturalism,” 90–91. 22. Compare David Papineau’s statement (“Rise of Naturalism,” 174) that “physicalism, as it is understood today, has no direct methodological implications.” 23. Montero (“Physicalism,” 187) answers “yes.” 24. Nagel, “Naturalism Reconsidered,” 8–9. 25. Draper, “God, Science, and Naturalism,” 277. 26. Lewontin, “Billions and Billions of Demons,” 26. 27. Ibid.
168 Notes 28. The sociologist Peter Berger (Sacred Canopy, 100) uses the phrase “methodological atheism,” which more precisely describes the aspect of naturalism in which I am interested. But I shall continue to use the phrase “methodological naturalism,” with the qualifi cation that it is the exclusion of divine agency in which I am interested. 29. The cross-references throughout this study are to the numbered sections of each chapter. The fi rst number indicates the chapter in which the relevant section is to be found. So 1.2.2 refers to the relevant subsection of Chapter 1 (the present chapter). 30. Quine, “Naturalism,” 257. 31. Pennock, Tower of Babel, 190. 32. Ibid., 191. 33. Ruse, “The New Creationism,” 180–81. 34. Johnson, Reason in the Balance, 211. 35. A similar point is made by Paul Draper (“God, Science, and Naturalism,” 299–300). 36. Johnson, Reason in the Balance, 105. 37. Johnson, “Unravelling of Scientifi c Materialism,” 23. 38. Lewontin, “Billions and Billions of Demons,” 31. 39. Numbers, “Science without God,” 267–69, 280. 40. Carroll, “Introduction,” 29. 41. Darwin, Origin of Species, Chap. 13 (428–32). 42. Neal Gillespie’s Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation (1979) offers a philosophically aware and historically insightful account, which has yet to be bettered. 43. While some early twentieth-century philosophers took a narrower view—Otto Neurath, for instance, saw successful prediction as the primary object of science (Hempel, “Logical Positivism,” 173)—the task of explanation took centre stage in the work of their successors. Carl Hempel, for example, wrote that “to explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the question ‘why?’ rather than only the question ‘what?’, is one of the foremost objectives of empirical science” (Hempel, Aspects of Scientifi c Explanation, 245). 44. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 386–87. 45. Fakhry, “Classical Islamic Arguments,” 133–45. 46. Craig, The Kalām Cosmological Argument, 8. 47. There are philosophers, infl uenced by the later Wittgenstein (see 3.1.2), who suggest that religious beliefs should not be regarded as explanatory hypotheses. (Phillips, Religion without Explanation, 116; idem, Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation, 164). If this is intended to be a descriptive rather than a prescriptive statement, it seems simply false (Banner, Justifi cation of Science, 87–95). On many occasions, believers at least think that their beliefs are explanatory (Boyer, Naturalness of Religious Ideas, 43, 125–54). And some of these believers are also philosophers. 48. A similar criticism was made by Larry Laudan (“Commentary: Science at the Bar—Causes for Concern”) in the wake of the 1982 McLean vs. Arkansas Board of Education creationism trial. 49. Jones, “Memorandum Opinion,” 64 (emphasis mine). 50. Draper, “God, Science, and Naturalism,” 288–89. 51. Swinburne, The Existence of God, 38–45. 52. Brauer, Forrest, and Gey, “Is it Science Yet?” 48. 53. Ibid., 48–49. 54. It may be that talk of “intuition” here is also unhelpful, for the reliability of an intuitive procedure may be intersubjectively testable. Chicken-sexing, as
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To Anna who never tires of asking
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Acknowledgements My thanks are due
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3 What are Theistic Explanations? I
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6 Inference to the Best Explanation
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7 Successful Theistic Explanations
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Page 158 and 159: Appendix Intentional Explanations M
Page 160 and 161: Appendix 149 attend any discussion
Page 162 and 163: Appendix 151 explanation is a causa
Page 164 and 165: Appendix 153 we assume is a “myth
Page 166 and 167: Appendix 155 Will this suffi ce as
Page 168 and 169: Appendix 157 reasoning, Schueler su
Page 170 and 171: Appendix 159 action, one that has a
Page 172 and 173: Appendix 161 estimate of her charac
Page 174 and 175: Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
Page 176 and 177: Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
Page 180 and 181: Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
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Page 184 and 185: Notes 173 the most explicit in its
Page 186 and 187: Notes 175 any true proposition, the
Page 188 and 189: Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
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Page 203 and 204: 192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
Page 205 and 206: 194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
Page 207 and 208: 196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
Page 209 and 210: 198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
Page 211 and 212: 200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
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Page 218 and 219: intelligent design theory: argument
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Page 222: tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
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