Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

132 Theism and Explanation
notoriously had no need of that hypothesis. Until 1859, it seemed that the
diversity of living organisms could not be accounted for without reference to
God, but Charles Darwin offered us a more successful, natural alternative.
In the face of such successes, many religious thinkers simply abandoned
the natural world to the secular sciences. Shortly after reading Darwin’s
Origin of Species, the geologist Charles Lyell wrote in his diary: “It is not
from enquiries in to the physical world, present or past, that we gain an
insight into the spiritual; we may arrive at conclusions unwelcome to our
speculations.” 64 As Michael Bartholomew writes,
it is a revealing comment. Before 1859 natural philosophers in Britain
had confi dently believed precisely the opposite. They were certain that
enquiries into the physical world were bound to elicit clear insights into
“the spiritual,” insights so unambiguous that they could be used as a
foundation for a defence of the Christian faith. In 1859 that foundation
turned to dust, and Lyell’s brief statement can stand as an emblem of
his recognition of that disaster. 65
Indeed, the “intelligent design” and creationist movements of today can be
seen as, in part, a reaction to Lyell’s counsel of despair.
One might argue that this history is just that, history. Past failure does
not, strictly speaking, preclude future success. Who knows? We may yet
require the theistic hypothesis. That is true. But it is also true that any proposed
theistic explanation comes out of a stable whose horses have previously
performed badly. A prudent punter will be reluctant to put money on
its future success. From a Bayesian point of view, you might argue that the
past failure of the tradition of theistic explanation lowers the prior probability
of any proposed theistic hypothesis. But even from the explanationist
perspective which I have chosen (2.1.3.2), you can argue that past failure
counts against present acceptance. It establishes what one might describe as
a defeasible presumption in favour of natural explanations. 66
One recent writer, Richard Carrier, defends this view by offering an
inductive argument for the scientist’s presumption of naturalism. “Natural
explanations,” he writes, “have had a fl awless track record: every time we
get to the bottom of things, it is always a natural explanation that ends up
being true.” 67 We need not share Carrier’s complacent view that the record
of modern science has been “fl awless.” All we need note is that it has been
successful, fl aws and all. Belonging to a successful research tradition of
this kind is an explanatory virtue. And it is a virtue that proposed theistic
explanations clearly lack.
7.4 SIMPLICITY
What about the criterion of simplicity, to which I have already had reason
to refer? A key issue here is that of defi nition. What makes a theory simple?