Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

Notes 187
this be a fatal objection? In any case, it does so only if we think that a
cause must be both a necessary and suffi cient condition of its effect. But
as Mackie argues (Cement of the Universe, 62), a cause may contribute
to an effect without being a suffi cient condition of it. It may be merely
an INUS—“an insuffi cient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but
suffi cient”—condition.
23. Swinburne, Existence of God, 42.
24. Does this solve the causal deviance problem? I think it does, since it means
that an act is not intentional unless it is caused by the agent’s unconditional
judgement that this “is to be done.” But a further solution might start with
the idea that intentional behaviour is sensitive to certain facts, and that causally
deviant action lacks this sensitivity (Bishop, Natural Agency, 148–50).
25. Dennett, Intentional Stance, 16.
26. Ibid., 16–17.
27. Ibid., 49.
28. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” 197.
29. Davidson, “Psychology as Philosophy,” 237.
30. Ibid., 236–37.
31. Dennett, Intentional Stance, 50.
32. Føllesdal, “Rationality Assumptions,” 316.
33. Popper, “Models, Instruments, and Truth,” 178.
34. The rationality principle, as we have seen, acts as a constraint on such explanations,
for as Schueler writes (Reasons and Purposes, 130 n.), “there will
almost always be numerous, confl icting, or even inconsistent interpretations
of any action, each of which will make some sense of it.” What we are looking
for is the interpretation that assumes the highest degree of rationality
(Dennett, Intentional Stance, 21).
35. Audi, Practical Reasoning, 116.
36. The example is based on one of Audi’s illustrations (Practical Reasoning,
114).
37. For a summary of the literature, see Allen and Reber’s article of the same
name.
38. Audi, Practical Reasoning, 99.
39. Von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, 96.
40. Davidson (“Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” 16) makes essentially the same
point, arguing that an intentional explanation must evaluate “the relative
force of the various desires and beliefs in the matrix of decision.” He concludes
that the practical syllogism cannot perform this explanatory role, since
it “exhausts its role in displaying an action as falling under one reason.” This
is true, but it does not prevent us from asking, and attempting to answer, the
broader question.
41. Audi (Practical Reasoning, 88) does recognise the possibility of “confl icting
reasons.” But his basic schema does not allow us to deal with them. One
could represent the different reasons by way of different practical syllogisms,
but the question then arises as to how these can be integrated to produce a
single intention.
42. My example is loosely based on Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 115–16.
43. More precisely, it will need to include a comparative evaluative premise, since
some of the other premises may also express judgements of value, as we shall
see in a moment.
44. Schueler, Reasons and Purposes, 69.
45. Ibid., 70.
46. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7; see Audi, Practical Reasoning, 19–24.
47. Davidson, “How is Weakness of Will Possible?” 21–22.