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Potential Theistic Explanations 81 abilities of human designers. 7 Perhaps we could identify the designed products even of extraterrestrial intelligent beings, on the assumption that they are the products of an evolutionary process similar to that which produced us. The problem is that the less similarity there is between a purported designer and ourselves, the less confi dent we can be in specifying how he might be expected to act. When it comes to God, who of all designers surely resembles us the least, we are entirely in the dark. This inability to specify how a putative designer might be expected to act is, Sober argues, “the Achilles’ heel of the design argument.” 8 Is there a way of avoiding this sceptical conclusion? Well, Sober notes, the theist may be tempted to argue that we do know what God intended. We can discover his intention by inspecting the products of his design, namely what we see around us. 9 But of course this merely begs the question, which is whether what we see around us is the product of divine design. Or theists might argue that if the existence of the vertebrate eye is what one wishes to explain, their hypothesis is that the intelligent designer constructed the vertebrate eye. If it is the characteris tics of the vertebrate eye (the fact that it has features F 1 , F 2 , . . . F n ), rather than its mere existence, that one wants to explain their hypothesis is that an intelligent designer constructed the vertebrate eye with the intention that it have features F 1 , F 2 , . . . F n and that this designer had the ability to bring his plans to fruition. 10 But this reasoning is empty, since it would enable the proposition God created it to “explain” anything at all. More precisely, such reasoning merely builds into the theistic hypothesis “the observations we seek to explain.” 11 For this reason, I would add, it would be another case of what Philip Kitcher calls “spurious unifi cation” (3.2.3.1). 12 Sober’s view seems to be that this is a kind of in principle objection. However, I have already described it as a de facto one (2.2.1). The following argument does constitute a potential explanation of E. (1) God wills E. (2) Whatever God wills comes to pass. (3) Therefore E. For it does correspond to the second premise of Peirce’s schema (2.1.2). The problem is that it does so in an almost trivial fashion, which is little more than a restatement of E. And it is a potential explanation we have good reason not to accept, since it would be untestable (7.1). Sober does concede that the theist could keep postulating divine goal-ability pairs until she fi nds one which does explain the world as we see it. But, he argues, one cannot simply invent such auxiliary hypotheses at will. They need to be independently testable and, ideally, to have passed independent tests. 13
82 Theism and Explanation 5.1.3 Is Sober Correct? What are we to make of Elliot Sober’s criticisms? Unlike Sober, I am not using confi rmation theory to analyse theistic explanations, for reasons I have already given (2.1.3.2). Nonetheless, there is much here with which I would agree. If we are to judge a theistic explanation to be a potential explanation, we must be able to specify what would follow if it were true. And we must be able to specify this in a way that is independent of the fact that we know the explanandum to be true. Given a deductivist account of intentional explanations (2.1.4), we must be able to produce an argument that has the explanans among its premises and a description of the explanandum as its conclusion. I shall refer to this as the criterion of independent specifi cation. 14 Its signifi cance was already recognised by David Hume. As I noted earlier, Hume posed the question that I shall argue is central to the success of any theistic explanation. “Is the world considered in general, and as it appears to us in this life, different from what a man or such a limited being would, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise, and benevolent Deity?” 15 If some fact about the world is not what we would expect of such a being, then appeal to the actions of God cannot be said to explain it. 5.2 The Rationality Principle But is Sober’s scepticism warranted? Do we need to be theological sceptics? Let’s approach this question afresh. Sober’s objection to the design argument is that it places no constraint on how a putative divine designer might be expected to act. The supposed omnipotence of God—the idea that he could do anything that is logically possible—merely makes this problem worse. As he writes, “an engineer who is more limited would be more predictable.” 16 But is this correct? Do proposed theistic explanations place no constraints on how God might be expected to work? 5.2.1 An Explanatory Constraint I have argued that a proposed theistic explanation is one that views the explanan dum as the means of achieving a divinely willed goal. More precisely, it attributes to God the desire to achieve a particular end, and invites us to see the explanandum as a means towards this end. It is true that some proposed theistic explanations may not do this. They may deserve condemnation, since—as Sober suggests—they merely build into the hypothesis “the observations we seek to explain.” 17 But all this means is that some proposed theistic explanations are fl awed. It does not mean that all proposed theistic explanations are fl awed or that no account of divine action could have any explanatory force. If the theist proposes a divinely-willed goal and suggests that the explanandum is the means by which God achieves this goal, then her proposed explanation does face a constraint. It may not
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Theism and Explanation
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Theism and Explanation Gregory W. D
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To Anna who never tires of asking
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Acknowledgements My thanks are due
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2 Theism and Explanation Could it m
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4 Theism and Explanation While I ho
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6 Theism and Explanation experiment
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8 Theism and Explanation Plantinga
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14 Theism and Explanation explanati
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16 Theism and Explanation God creat
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2 On Explanations in General “Exp
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On Explanations in General 21 of ou
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On Explanations in General 23 merel
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Figure 2.2 Swinburne’s conception
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On Explanations in General 27 simil
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On Explanations in General 29 condi
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Successful Theistic Explanations 13
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8 Conclusion Miss Binney spoke as i
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Conclusion 145 explanation that met
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Appendix Intentional Explanations M
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Appendix 149 attend any discussion
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Appendix 151 explanation is a causa
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Appendix 153 we assume is a “myth
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Appendix 155 Will this suffi ce as
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Appendix 157 reasoning, Schueler su
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Appendix 159 action, one that has a
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Appendix 161 estimate of her charac
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Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
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Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
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Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers
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Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
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Notes 171 19. Musgrave, “Scientif
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Notes 173 the most explicit in its
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Notes 175 any true proposition, the
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Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
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Notes 179 15. Hume, “Dialogues,
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Notes 181 19. Swinburne, Is There a
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Notes 183 it will also confi rm H 2
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Notes 185 91. I am grateful to Geor
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Notes 187 this be a fatal objection
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Notes 189 71. Lakatos, “Falsifi c
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192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
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194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
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196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
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198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
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200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
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Index A abduction: and induction, 1
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defences, and theodicies, 134-35 de
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intelligent design theory: argument
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preemption, causal. See causal pree
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tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
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