Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

More documents

Recommendations

Info

8 Conclusion Miss Binney spoke as if this explanation ended the matter, but the kindergarten was not convinced. Beverly Cleary Let me end this enquiry by stating my conclusions, before returning to the question with which I began, that of the methodological naturalism of the modern sciences. 8.1 A SILVER BULLET? In Chapters 1 to 4 of this study, I examined a number of the objections that might be raised against proposed theistic explanations. Those objections will by now be familiar. The fi rst is that proposed theistic explanations exclude no possible state of affairs; the second is that the actions of an agent capable of miracles would be unpredictable; the third suggests that the very concept of God is incoherent; the fourth maintains that the will of God cannot be a cause. I have argued that while these objections raise some serious issues with which a theist philosopher ought to grapple, they do not, in themselves, rule out the possibility of a successful theistic explanation. In Chapter 5, I set out the circumstances in which invoking a divine agent would constitute a potential explanation of some state of affairs. It would do so, I argued, only if we could conceive of no better way in which a divine agent could have brought about his posited intention. This optimality condition constitutes a powerful constraint upon any proposed theistic explanation. Given the existence of apparently pointless evils, the theist will have a diffi cult task showing that his proposed explanation meets this condition. But let’s assume that the theist could do so. Let’s say that we could be warranted in regarding an account of divine agency as a potential explanation of some state of affairs. What would follow? Well, not very much. The theist would still need to show that his proposed explanation was a successful one, that we had suffi cient reason to accept it. Chapter 7 set out the conditions that a potential theistic explanation would have to meet in order to be regarded as the actual explanation of some state of affairs. It has shown that measured against a list of accepted explanatory virtues, a theistic hypothesis is simply incapable of achieving a high score. It is not (as things stand) consistent
144 Theism and Explanation with the rest of our knowledge, it comes from a tradition whose proposed explanations have previously scored poorly, it is ontologically extravagant, and it does not enable us to predict the precise details of the effect. It other words, it lacks many of the qualities we would normally demand of successful explanations. What conclusion, then, have I reached? If, on a number of key points, we give the theist the benefi t of the doubt, we cannot exclude the bare possibility that there might one day exist a successful theistic explanation. The reason for this is that at least some of these criticisms represent contingent (rather than necessary) failings. As things stand, for instance, proposed theistic explanations are not consistent with the rest of our knowledge. But we can imagine things being otherwise. It follows that we cannot be certain that no account of divine agency could ever warrant acceptance as the explanation of some state of affairs. But if a proposed theistic explanation must meet the conditions set out above—which are no more onerous than those we demand of other explanations—then that possibility seems remote. Many if not all proposed theistic explanations can be shown to be not even potential explanations of the facts to be explained, since they fail to meet the optimality condition (5.3.3). And even if they met this fi rst condition, they will (at present) score poorly when ranked against key explanatory virtues. They are unlikely to be the best explanations of any state of affairs. And even if they were the only potential explanations on offer, we would have good reason to seek natural alternatives. Many atheists will regard this as an unsatisfying conclusion. For it does not exclude the possibility that we could, one day, have suffi cient reason to accept a proposed theistic explanation. The possibility may be remote, but it remains “on the books” (as it were). It follows, they might argue, that my arguments do not provide what is needed: a “silver bullet,” which could “put a merciful end to all the nonsense.” There is no in principle argument which would exclude any proposed theistic explanation, a priori (as it were). Applied to the debate regarding scientifi c naturalism, my discussion fails to offer a principled reason for excluding (once and for all) talk of divine agency from the sciences. 8.2 Methodological Naturalism? Does this matter? I suspect not. At the very beginning of my discussion I distinguished between two senses of the term “naturalism.” The fi rst, which I attributed to Quine, holds that there are certain standards which any successful explanation must meet. If a proposed theistic explanation met these standards, then we should embrace it. It is a further question, albeit one much debated in the literature, whether we choose to call such an explanation “scientifi c.” Politically and legally, it may be an important issue, but nothing of any philosophical importance rests on the answer we give. My own view is that it would be odd to exclude from the sciences any
Page 2 and 3:
Theism and Explanation
Page 4 and 5:
Theism and Explanation Gregory W. D
Page 6:
To Anna who never tires of asking
Page 10:
Acknowledgements My thanks are due
Page 13 and 14:
2 Theism and Explanation Could it m
Page 15 and 16:
4 Theism and Explanation While I ho
Page 17 and 18:
6 Theism and Explanation experiment
Page 19 and 20:
8 Theism and Explanation Plantinga
Page 21 and 22:
10 Theism and Explanation explanati
Page 23 and 24:
12 Theism and Explanation by refere
Page 25 and 26:
14 Theism and Explanation explanati
Page 27 and 28:
16 Theism and Explanation God creat
Page 30 and 31:
2 On Explanations in General “Exp
Page 32 and 33:
On Explanations in General 21 of ou
Page 34 and 35:
On Explanations in General 23 merel
Page 36 and 37:
Figure 2.2 Swinburne’s conception
Page 38 and 39:
On Explanations in General 27 simil
Page 40 and 41:
On Explanations in General 29 condi
Page 42 and 43:
On Explanations in General 31 could
Page 44 and 45:
3 What are Theistic Explanations? I
Page 46 and 47:
What are Theistic Explanations? 35
Page 48 and 49:
Page 50 and 51:
Page 52 and 53:
3.2.2 Positing a Divine Agent What
Page 54 and 55:
Page 56 and 57:
Page 58 and 59:
Page 60 and 61:
Page 62 and 63:
Page 64 and 65:
Page 66 and 67:
Page 68 and 69:
Page 70 and 71:
4 What Would They Explain? It’s a
Page 72 and 73:
4.2 SINGULAR AND GENERAL EXPLANATIO
Page 74 and 75:
What Would They Explain? 63 shelter
Page 76 and 77:
What Would They Explain? 65 were we
Page 78 and 79:
What Would They Explain? 67 not des
Page 80 and 81:
What Would They Explain? 69 must of
Page 82 and 83:
What Would They Explain? 71 to prod
Page 84 and 85:
What Would They Explain? 73 There i
Page 86:
What Would They Explain? 75 how mig
Page 89 and 90:
78 Theism and Explanation contradic
Page 91 and 92:
80 Theism and Explanation low—tha
Page 93 and 94:
82 Theism and Explanation 5.1.3 Is
Page 95 and 96:
84 Theism and Explanation eye. But
Page 97 and 98:
86 Theism and Explanation If we acc
Page 99 and 100:
88 Theism and Explanation Why not,
Page 101 and 102:
90 Theism and Explanation directly,
Page 103 and 104: 92 Theism and Explanation of divers
Page 105 and 106: 94 Theism and Explanation there can
Page 107 and 108: 96 Theism and Explanation already c
Page 109 and 110: 98 Theism and Explanation (2.1.2) t
Page 112 and 113: 6 Inference to the Best Explanation
Page 114 and 115: Inference to the Best Explanation 1
Page 126 and 127: 7 Successful Theistic Explanations
Page 128 and 129: Successful Theistic Explanations 11
Page 156 and 157: Conclusion 145 explanation that met
Page 158 and 159: Appendix Intentional Explanations M
Page 160 and 161: Appendix 149 attend any discussion
Page 162 and 163: Appendix 151 explanation is a causa
Page 164 and 165: Appendix 153 we assume is a “myth
Page 166 and 167: Appendix 155 Will this suffi ce as
Page 168 and 169: Appendix 157 reasoning, Schueler su
Page 170 and 171: Appendix 159 action, one that has a
Page 172 and 173: Appendix 161 estimate of her charac
Page 174 and 175: Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
Page 176 and 177: Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
Page 178 and 179: Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers
Page 180 and 181: Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
Page 182 and 183: Notes 171 19. Musgrave, “Scientif
Page 184 and 185: Notes 173 the most explicit in its
Page 186 and 187: Notes 175 any true proposition, the
Page 188 and 189: Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
Page 190 and 191: Notes 179 15. Hume, “Dialogues,
Page 192 and 193: Notes 181 19. Swinburne, Is There a
Page 194 and 195: Notes 183 it will also confi rm H 2
Page 196 and 197: Notes 185 91. I am grateful to Geor
Page 198 and 199: Notes 187 this be a fatal objection
Page 200: Notes 189 71. Lakatos, “Falsifi c
Page 203 and 204: 192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
Page 205 and 206:
194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
Page 207 and 208:
196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
Page 209 and 210:
198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
Page 211 and 212:
200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
Page 214 and 215:
Index A abduction: and induction, 1
Page 216 and 217:
defences, and theodicies, 134-35 de
Page 218 and 219:
intelligent design theory: argument
Page 220 and 221:
preemption, causal. See causal pree
Page 222:
tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
show all

Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?