Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly
Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly
Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly
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38 <strong>Theism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Explanation</strong><br />
argue that even the acceptance of a theory entails a certain belief. And so<br />
it does. But what it entails is not necessarily belief in the theory; it can be<br />
belief in some fact about the theory (such as its fruitfulness). 25 Under what<br />
circumstances (if any) IBE would warrant belief (simpliciter) is an important<br />
question, but it is not one I need address here.<br />
All that IBE needs <strong>to</strong> support, for my purposes, is the kind of commitment<br />
discussed by John Bishop, who has offered a defence of what he<br />
calls (rather misleadingly) religious “belief.” In fact, what Bishop is arguing<br />
is that a religious commitment can sometimes be what he describes as<br />
a “subdoxastic venture.” A subdoxastic venture is one in which we take a<br />
proposition <strong>to</strong> be true in our practical reasoning, without actually considering<br />
it true, since we realise that it is not adequately supported by the <strong>to</strong>tal<br />
available evidence. 26 Bishop offers a William James-style defence of the<br />
conditions under which this might be defensible, on which I shall offer no<br />
comment. But what I am suggesting is that a similar (subdoxastic) attitude<br />
might be defensible if it could be shown that a proposed theistic explanation<br />
was indeed the best explanation on offer of some puzzling phenomenon. I<br />
suspect that Bishop would share my pessimism about the likely success of<br />
such a project, but it is its mere possibility that I wish <strong>to</strong> argue for here.<br />
3.1.3 Physics <strong>and</strong> Theology<br />
What I have been arguing is that proposed theistic explanations resemble<br />
some explanations in the natural sciences insofar as they posit an unobservable<br />
entity. But the opponent of proposed theistic explanation might argue<br />
that while this is true, the parallel does not take us very far. The fact that<br />
scientists also posit unobservable entities offers little support <strong>to</strong> proposed<br />
theistic explanations, for the being whose existence is posited in a theistic<br />
explanation is very different from the entities whose existence is posited,<br />
say, in physics. It may be true that God resembles an electron insofar as he<br />
is generally regarded as inaccessible <strong>to</strong> observation. 27 But in other respects,<br />
the two are hardly comparable. An electron, however inaccessible it may<br />
be <strong>to</strong> observation, is at least part of the same physical universe as other,<br />
observable entities. It obeys the same kinds of laws as other entities. And<br />
we have well-established theories about how electrons interact with things<br />
we can observe. The presence of an electron can be traced in a more direct<br />
manner than the presence of God. (It might, for instance, leave a track in a<br />
cloud chamber.) And of course, as we shall see in a moment, an electron is<br />
an impersonal entity, whereas God is supposed <strong>to</strong> be a personal being, one<br />
who has something analogous <strong>to</strong> human beliefs <strong>and</strong> desires. Yet unlike all<br />
the personal agents with whom we are familiar, he is an unembodied agent.<br />
How, then, can he interact with the material world?<br />
This is a serious objection. If we are <strong>to</strong> regard God as a theoretical<br />
entity, comparable in this respect <strong>to</strong> an electron, we shall have <strong>to</strong> take<br />
in<strong>to</strong> account just how peculiar this posited being would be. In particular,