Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

60 Theism and Explanation
4.1.1 States of Affairs
Let me begin with states of affairs. The explanandum of a theistic explanation
is not always an event, in the sense of something closely bounded
in space and time. It is sometimes a state of affairs, one which exists over
time and may be distributed in space. It may even be a state of affairs coextensive
with time itself, as in the case of the existence of the universe.
As I noted earlier, one way of construing the cosmological argument is to
see it as a response to Leibniz’s question, “Why is there something rather
than nothing?” Here we have a state of affairs—the existence of something
rather than nothing—without which there could be no other state of affairs
(other than the existence of God himself). A similar comment may be made
about Richard Swinburne’s teleological argument, which suggests that positing
the existence of God explains the very existence of laws of nature. 3
Here, too, we have a state of affairs in a very broad sense of the term. In
fact, this state of affairs may turn out to be identical with the fi rst, since it
is hard to see how one could have a universe which did not include regular,
law-like processes. 4
4.1.2 Events
Alongside theistic explanations of states of affairs we also fi nd explanations
of particular events. These are the explanations of narrow scope to which
Philip Clayton refers (“Yahweh caused the Flood to punish the people’s
sinfulness; God allowed the fl at tire to teach me patience”). 5 A striking,
real-life example of such an explanation came to light as I was writing this
chapter. Shortly after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004, the
chief Sephardic rabbi of Israel “explained” the catastrophe by attributing
it to God’s anger at our neglect of his commandments. 6 One might regard
this suggestion as morally abhorrent, but it at least takes seriously the logic
of classical theism. If there is a God, then he was responsible for the event,
and must have had some reason to bring it about. 7 And in offering such an
explanation, the rabbi stands in a long tradition. Theistic explanations of
particular events, particularly catastrophes, have been enormously infl uential.
Indeed much of the Bible consists of a series of such explanations.
As a general rule, theistic philosophers favour theistic explanations of
states of affairs over explanations of particular events. (To sophisticated
believers, the latter can appear a little naïve.) Indeed from the theist’s
point of view, the more fundamental the state of affairs, the better. A
hypothesis of the broadest possible scope—one that covers the existence
of the universe or the existence of laws of nature—is unlikely to have a
competing, natural explanation. In fact, in some cases, a natural explanation
may be simply inconceivable. (What would it mean to offer a natural
explanation of the existence of laws of nature?) I shall come back to this
idea shortly (4.3.2).