Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

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Appendix 157 reasoning, Schueler suggests, would explain why such an agent would form the intention to vote for a tax increase. (1) Subsidized day care is a good thing. (2) This proposed tax increase is necessary if there is to be subsidized day care in my community. (3) At the same time, it will cost me some money, which I would like to use elsewhere, if this tax increase is passed. (4) Still, it is more important that my community have subsidized day care than that I keep for my own use the few dollars it will cost me each year. (5) So, I should vote for this tax increase. 44 Premises (2) and (3) give reasons that would, considered individually, lead to different actions. So it is premise (4) which plays the key role here. It shows why the agent acted as she did, favouring one set of reasons over another. The importance of the evaluative premise (4) is shown by looking at an explanation of why someone might not vote for the tax increase. It could be identical to the fi rst, except for the fourth premise (and, of course, the conclusion). (1) Subsidized day care is a good thing. (2) This proposed tax increase is necessary if there is to be subsidized day care in my community. (3) At the same time, it will cost me some money, which I would like to use elsewhere, if this tax increase is passed. (4) It is more important that I keep for my own use the few dollars it will cost me each year than that my community have subsidized day care. 45 (5) So, I should not vote for this tax increase. Both agents might agree that subsidized childcare is valuable. Both agents might recognise the cost to themselves of voting for the increase. Both might wish to keep the money for themselves. To this extent they have the same beliefs and desires. Where they differ is in the relative weight which they assign to these considerations. And it is this which is captured by the evaluative premise (4). A.2.3 The Problem of Akrasia In the discussion to this point, I have made a couple of key distinctions. The fi rst is that between a desire and an intention (Appendix 1.2). The second is between what we might call a “fi rst-order” intentional explanation, which takes us from posited intention to action, and a “second-order” explanation, which explains why the agent formed this particular intention (Appendix 2.2).
158 Appendix Let me illustrate the importance of these distinctions by way of a brief discussion of “weakness of will,” the problem of akrasia to which Aristotle refers. 46 If we follow Davidson’s original formulation, and understand a (fi rst-order) intentional explanation as one that cites an agent’s beliefs and desires, then weakness of will becomes a problem. For the fact is that agents do not always act in the way in which it would be reasonable for them to act, given their beliefs and desires. Yet their “incontinent” actions (as Davidson calls them 47 ) are still intentional. So if we defi ne an intentional action is one that is reasonable, given the agent’s beliefs and desires, then we have lots of counterexamples: intentional actions that are not reasonable, given the agent’s beliefs and desires. Let me examine this issue more closely. Taking a slightly different line from that which I have advocated, Robert Audi has argued that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is most plausibly regarded as a proposition about how the agent ought to act, given certain beliefs and desires. It is not a description of the action itself. 48 Would this solve our diffi culty? No, it would not. It merely highlights it. For if I suffer from akrasia, then I can decide how I ought to act and yet fail to act. Let me offer an example. After careful refl ection, I have decided that animal suffering has ethical signifi cance and that the commercial production of meat entails signifi cant animal suffering. As an ethical agent, I want to minimise suffering, and in the light of these considerations I have decided to embrace vegetarianism. But faced with the steak option on the restaurant menu, and seeing the succulent meat being devoured by fellow diners, I can’t resist. I order and eat the steak. This is surely a case of akrasia; my eating the steak is an “incontinent” action. The problem is that it is also an intentional act, an act performed for a reason. But the reason it is performed does not correspond to the conclusion of a practical syllogism that has my relevant beliefs and desires as its premises. How can this be? It is at this point that we require the distinction between a desire and an intention. An intention, I argued earlier (Appendix 1.2), is an unconditional judgement that a particular course of action is to be adopted. When all is going well, an agent’s intention will correspond to the conclusion of a practical syllogism that has his relevant beliefs and desires as its premises. One could, in other words, offer a successful “second-order” explanation of why he formed that particular intention. But in the case of an agent who suffers from akrasia, these two come apart. The incontinent act is still an intentional act, one performed for a reason. I order and eat the steak because I have formed the intention to eat meat, at least on this occasion. So one could offer a successful “fi rst-order” explanation of why I ate the steak. The problem is that the formation of this intention was not a rational act, given my other beliefs and desires. Weakness of will, on this account, represents a failure to act in an entirely rational way when forming an intention. So can such action be explained intentionally? Yes, it can. It can be explained by way of a fi rst-order intentional
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Theism and Explanation
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Theism and Explanation Gregory W. D
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To Anna who never tires of asking
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Acknowledgements My thanks are due
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Figure 2.2 Swinburne’s conception
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3 What are Theistic Explanations? I
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What are Theistic Explanations? 35
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6 Inference to the Best Explanation
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Inference to the Best Explanation 1
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Inference to the Best Explanation 1
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Page 156 and 157: Conclusion 145 explanation that met
Page 158 and 159: Appendix Intentional Explanations M
Page 160 and 161: Appendix 149 attend any discussion
Page 162 and 163: Appendix 151 explanation is a causa
Page 164 and 165: Appendix 153 we assume is a “myth
Page 166 and 167: Appendix 155 Will this suffi ce as
Page 170 and 171: Appendix 159 action, one that has a
Page 172 and 173: Appendix 161 estimate of her charac
Page 174 and 175: Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
Page 176 and 177: Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
Page 178 and 179: Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers
Page 180 and 181: Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
Page 182 and 183: Notes 171 19. Musgrave, “Scientif
Page 184 and 185: Notes 173 the most explicit in its
Page 186 and 187: Notes 175 any true proposition, the
Page 188 and 189: Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
Page 190 and 191: Notes 179 15. Hume, “Dialogues,
Page 192 and 193: Notes 181 19. Swinburne, Is There a
Page 194 and 195: Notes 183 it will also confi rm H 2
Page 196 and 197: Notes 185 91. I am grateful to Geor
Page 198 and 199: Notes 187 this be a fatal objection
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Page 203 and 204: 192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
Page 205 and 206: 194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
Page 207 and 208: 196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
Page 209 and 210: 198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
Page 211 and 212: 200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
Page 214 and 215: Index A abduction: and induction, 1
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intelligent design theory: argument
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preemption, causal. See causal pree
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tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
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