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Appendix Intentional Explanations Motivation is a central human concern . . . And the “scientifi c” way to understand it is, as with everything else, is to take it on its own terms and fi nd concepts for bringing out its typical patterns. Mary Midgley As I noted earlier (3.2.1), intentional explanations have long been a contested issue among both philosophers and psychologists. If, as is sometimes suggested, any proposed explanation of this form is fatally fl awed, then theistic explanations are also fatally fl awed. End of discussion. As it happens, I do not think that intentional explanations are fatally fl awed. But since none of the relevant arguments are specifi c to theistic explanations, it seemed best to relegate discussion of this topic to an appendix. Before I begin, a qualifi cation seems in order. My analysis will employ concepts such as “belief,” “desire,” and “intention.” As I noted earlier (3.2), these are often described as “folk psychological” concepts, and it is the use of such concepts that is philosophically controversial. I have already made reference to Matthew Ratcliffe’s recent challenge to the role of folk psychology in social interaction (7.6.3). Ratcliffe argues that there are many circumstances in which we do not need to posit beliefs and desires in order to make sense of other people’s behaviour. It is suffi cient that we understand the shared social norms governing human behaviour in particular situations. To illustrate his point, Ratcliffe cites Alfred Schutz’s analysis of “ideal types”: If I observe, or even hear about, a man tightening a nut, my fi rst interpretive scheme will picture him as joining together two parts of an apparatus with a wrench. The further information that the event is taking place in an automobile factory permits me to place the operation within the total context of “automobile” manufacturing. If I know in addition that the man is an auto worker, then I can assume a great deal about him, for instance, that he comes to work every morning and goes home every night, that he picks up his check every payday, and so on. I can then bring him into a wider context of meaning by applying to him the ideal type “urban worker” or, more specifi cally, “Berlin worker of the year 1931.” And once I have established the fact that the man is a
148 Appendix German and a Berliner, then all the corresponding interpretive schemes become applicable to him. 1 In this situation, Ratcliffe argues, the man’s behaviour is entirely explicable without attributing to him any mental states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. There is much in Ratcliffe’s analysis that is worthy of discussion. It is not clear that an explanation by reference to social norms would be a causal explanation, 2 but there can be little doubt that we often understand the actions of others by reference to such norms. Indeed, I have already argued that his account provides a further reason to be sceptical of proposed theistic explanations, since in the case of such proposed explanations we cannot appeal to shared social norms or anything analogous to them (7.6.3). All we can do in the case of a posited divine agent is to attribute to that agent certain beliefs and desires and to see what explanatory force this attribution would offer. But precisely for this reason, I have restricted myself to a traditional folk-psychological account of intentional explanations. There may be other factors that enter into the explanation of human behaviour, but it is the folk-psychological account that offers the most helpful way of thinking about proposed theistic explanations. A.1 ACTIONS, REASONS, AND CAUSES The starting point for much of the contemporary discussion has been Donald Davidson’s 1963 paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” That paper begins by discussing what it means for something to be a reason for an action. It goes on to discuss whether a reason is also a cause. Davidson answers these question by defending two theses, which following G. F. Schueler I shall refer to as the “belief-desire” thesis (BD) and the “causal thesis” (CT). 3 BD: R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under the description d only if R consists of a pro attitude of the agent towards actions with a certain property, and a belief of that agent that A, under the description d, has that property. 4 CT: A primary reason for an action is its cause. 5 It is the second (causal) thesis that is the particular focus of Davidson’s attention and much of his paper responds to objections to it. So what are we to make of these two theses? Are they defensible? A.1.1 The Causal Thesis While Davidson’s second, causal thesis has been the subject of some debate, 6 I have no quarrel with it. I have already touched on the diffi culties that
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Theism and Explanation
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Theism and Explanation Gregory W. D
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To Anna who never tires of asking
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Acknowledgements My thanks are due
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2 Theism and Explanation Could it m
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Figure 2.2 Swinburne’s conception
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On Explanations in General 27 simil
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3 What are Theistic Explanations? I
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What are Theistic Explanations? 35
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3.2.2 Positing a Divine Agent What
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4 What Would They Explain? It’s a
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4.2 SINGULAR AND GENERAL EXPLANATIO
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What Would They Explain? 65 were we
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What Would They Explain? 67 not des
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What Would They Explain? 71 to prod
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What Would They Explain? 73 There i
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What Would They Explain? 75 how mig
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82 Theism and Explanation 5.1.3 Is
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88 Theism and Explanation Why not,
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90 Theism and Explanation directly,
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92 Theism and Explanation of divers
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Page 156 and 157: Conclusion 145 explanation that met
Page 160 and 161: Appendix 149 attend any discussion
Page 162 and 163: Appendix 151 explanation is a causa
Page 164 and 165: Appendix 153 we assume is a “myth
Page 166 and 167: Appendix 155 Will this suffi ce as
Page 168 and 169: Appendix 157 reasoning, Schueler su
Page 170 and 171: Appendix 159 action, one that has a
Page 172 and 173: Appendix 161 estimate of her charac
Page 174 and 175: Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
Page 176 and 177: Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
Page 178 and 179: Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers
Page 180 and 181: Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
Page 182 and 183: Notes 171 19. Musgrave, “Scientif
Page 184 and 185: Notes 173 the most explicit in its
Page 186 and 187: Notes 175 any true proposition, the
Page 188 and 189: Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
Page 190 and 191: Notes 179 15. Hume, “Dialogues,
Page 192 and 193: Notes 181 19. Swinburne, Is There a
Page 194 and 195: Notes 183 it will also confi rm H 2
Page 196 and 197: Notes 185 91. I am grateful to Geor
Page 198 and 199: Notes 187 this be a fatal objection
Page 200: Notes 189 71. Lakatos, “Falsifi c
Page 203 and 204: 192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
Page 205 and 206: 194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
Page 207 and 208: 196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
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198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
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200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
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Index A abduction: and induction, 1
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defences, and theodicies, 134-35 de
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intelligent design theory: argument
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preemption, causal. See causal pree
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tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
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