Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

Appendix 163
causal laws do exist. They do not cover the relevant events described as
reasons, but they do cover the same events described in some other way—
“neurological, chemical, or physical.” 66 So propositions (1), (2), and (3) are
compatible.
Against Davidson. The principal objection to Davidson’s view is that it
apparently reduces reasons to epiphenomena, stripping them of their causal
status. 67 After all, Davidson has argued that we can speak of a cause only
where there exists a law. But he has also argued that there are no laws
governing events when these are described in the vocabulary of beliefs,
desires, and intentions. It follows that we cannot speak of an intention as a
cause. In other words, given the truth of propositions (1) and (2), proposition
(3)—Davidson’s causal thesis—must be false. So our three propositions
really do represent an inconsistent triad. Assuming that we want to
maintain (2) and (3), then we need to abandon (1). We need to abandon a
nomological view of causation.
If this objection is correct, then the key question is not an epistemic
one regarding explanation; it is a metaphysical question regarding causation.
And we cannot answer the epistemic question without answering the
metaphysical one. If we claim that there exist lawless causal explanations,
we are implicitly claiming that there can be causes that do not instantiate
(actual) regularities. I am inclined to think that this is not a problem, that
we are not bound to a nomological view of causation (4.2.1). But do we
need to say this? Is the objection correct?
In defence of Davidson. Let me restate Davidson’s position. What he
wants to say is that there can exist two descriptions of an event, one which
is (if you like) “physical” and one which is intentional. If we describe the
event using the language of the natural sciences, we can see that there exist
law-like regularities, the kinds of regularities that are essential to the existence
of causation. (Let’s grant Davidson this latter assumption, for the
sake of the argument.) But if we describe the event using the language of
intentional explanations, there are no laws to which we can appeal. Does
this mean that we cannot speak of an intention as a cause, given Davidson’s
assumption about causality? No, it does not. For both descriptions
refer to the one event, and it is on the level of the event that there exists (or
does not exist) a cause. After all, causation is a feature of the world, not a
feature of our descriptions of it. The following argument is invalid, since
it embodies a form of the representational fallacy. 68 It assumes (wrongly)
that we can deduce the structure of the world from the language we use
to describe it.
(1) Causation involves law-like relations.
(2) Intentional explanations do not cite causal laws.
(3) Therefore intentional explanations are not causal explanations.