Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

82 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
Within five years, one hundred of these field pieces were in service, but the gun
was soon proven obsolete. 22
A collateral development was the use of explosive shells with percussion fuzes,
giving field guns superiority at long distances over infantry rifles. Although shrapnel
had been introduced in the early nineteenth century, the fuzes were deficient and did
not give shells a range beyond that of solid shot. With perfected fuzes, the effect
of a single projectile increased considerably at all distances. More importantly, it
allowed the observation of the points of fall at all ranges and the regulation of fire
based on observation. 23
The Franco-Prussian War influenced field artillery employment as well as
weapons. The Prussians employed artillery aggressively in the field but not in the
forward line in the Napoleonic manner. Instead, they placed artillery pieces as
close behind the infantry line as possible. The effectiveness of Prussian artillery
was in large part due to the fact that it was armed with rifled breechloaders, while
the French still used muzzleloaders. In organization, the Prussians eliminated the
reserve, preferring instead to send their guns forward with the infantry. The French,
on the other hand, maintained a large artillery reserve for special concentrations.
To avoid a stalemate, the Prussians tried to bypass defensive positions, if possible,
but if an attack were deemed necessary, then it followed a heavy bombard ment.
Another tactic used by the Prussians was to seize ground in order to force an enemy
attack, thereby giving them the advantages of the defense. Although field fortifications
did not dominate the war as they had in the Civil War, trench warfare con cepts
continued to develop. 24
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, military conditions in the United
States were not conducive to employment of field artillery. Occasionally, field pieces
were decisive in campaigns against the Indians, but usually they only hindered the
mobility of maneuver forces. When they were employed, the gunners were often
not artillerists, but men detailed from the cavalry and infantry. Col. Henry J. Hunt
believed the situation intolerable, especially when only five of the ten field batteries
authorized in 1882 were mounted and equipped. Hunt also thought Gatling
guns would be effective against the Indians if trained artillerists and hardy animals
served them. 25
By the 1880s, coastal fortifications had fallen into such disrepair that the situation
could no longer be ignored. The beginnings of modernization in the Navy
called attention to the neglected harbors in which the newly authorized ships
would be based. Finally, in 1885 Congress established a board under Secretary
22 Schreier, “3.2-Inch Field Gun,” pp. 77–79; Birkhimer, Historical Sketch, pp. 195–96; WD GO
39, 28 Apr 1881; Nesmith, “Quiet Paradigm Change,” Ph.D. diss., pp. 212–22.
23 Maurice H. Anthoni, trans., “Influence of the Adoption of the New Guns on the Fire of Field Artillery,”
Journal of the United States Artillery 21 (May-June 1904): 285.
24 Nesmith, “Quiet Paradigm Change,” Ph.D. diss., pp. 123–24.
25 Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars (New York: Macmillian, 1973), pp. 72–73; WD GO 96, 15
Aug 1882. For additional information on the use of artillery in the Indian Wars, see Larry Don Roberts,
“The Artillery with the Regular Army in the West, 1866–1890” (Ph.D. diss, Oklahoma State University,
1981).