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302 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery M110A2 8-inch howitzer three) and enable the howitzers to be dispersed over the battlefield, thus increas ing survivability. Other advantages of the eight-howitzer batteries were more responsive firepower, improved capability for contin uous fire power, and more firepower with out a corresponding increase in overhead. The number of 155-mm. howitzers rose from fifty-four in the existing armored and mechanized divisions to ninety-six in the restructured division. The general-sup port artillery battalion was also to have four firing bat teries (rather than three), each with four M110 8-inch howitzers, thus raising the total number of 8-inch howitzers from twelve to six teen. As a result, the cannon in the division climbed from sixty-six to a hundred twelve. 45 In addition to the headquarters battery, each restructured battalion included a service battery (for handling battalion-level mess operations and ammunition and fuel resupply) and a maintenance battery (for maintaining the individual firing sections’ equipment in the forward areas). The firing sections each lost one cannoneer, making a total of nine soldiers in each section. The loss of the ammunition and mess sections to the service battery and the wire sections to the headquarters battery, coupled with the loss of one cannoneer per howitzer section, reduced the firing battery’s ability to maintain perimeter defense. Increased emphasis had to be placed on early warning to provide time to displace or prepare to defend an area. In all, the divisional direct-support battalions realized a 49-percent increase in personnel and a 78-percent increase in fire power. 46 45 Phase I Rpt, USATRADOC, 20 Dec 1976, sub: Division Restructuring Study, copy in CMH files; Combined Arms Center, “Division Restructur ing Evaluation. Independent Evaluation Report: Brigade Phase,” December 1979, 1:1–6, 16–20, and 4:1–7, Command Historian files, USATRADOC, Fort Monroe, Va., and copy in CMH files; Keith, “Forward Observa tions,” pp. 3–4; Darrell Mor geson, “DRS,” Field Artil lery Journal, November-December 1978, pp. 21–22. 46 Gibbs, “DRS,” pp. 36–40; Kenneth R. Knight, “DRS,” Field Artillery Journal, January-February 1979, pp. 44–49.
mOdernizaTiOn effOrTs 303 To increase survivability, tactics called for only one battery within a battalion to open fire initially and for the others to remain silent. Upon completion of one or two missions, the first battery would displace and another battery would assume fire mission responsibility until ordered to displace, again after firing only a few missions. This pattern would continue until the tactical situation demanded the fires of more than one battery simul taneously. The general-support bat talion was to be used primarily for counterfire and air defense suppression missions, although, when required, its fires could augment those of the direct-support artillery battalions supporting the maneu ver brigades. Additional firepower could come from the field artillery brigades attached to the division artillery. Almost all the logistical and maintenance functions were the concern of the battalion commander and his staff rather than the subordinate firing elements. 47 Difficulties with the restructuring, especially those experienced in the eightgun batteries, were not unexpected. For example, command-and-control functions were spread thin; surveys were accomplished too hastily or not at all because of frequent moves; weather data was received only once every four hours; and centralized management and computerized control of both the technical and tactical fire direction made one lose sight of the basics necessary for accurate artillery fire. The firing batteries, organized with one fire direction center and one battery operations center (rather than two fire direction centers, one for each four-gun platoon), were rated inadequate for self defense. Also, the single authorized officer in the fire direction center could not provide continuous supervision during sustained operations. Other problems included net control difficulties with new fire direction com puters, poor field mess operations, and a lack of sufficient communications equipment in the maintenance and service units. Through additional testing and changes in the structure of the units, TRADOC planners hoped to over come most of the problems in managing the larger batteries. The number of batteries in the howitzer battalion subsequently reverted to three, but the number of howitzers fielded in each remained at eight, divided in two four-gun platoons, each with its own fire direction center. 48 As a result, General Donn A. Starry, commanding the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command since July 1977, directed in December 1979 that maintenance resources be consolidated at the battalion level. Cells from the division support command maintenance battalion were to be allocated to the battalions when deployed for training or combat. 49 In June 1979, General Meyer, shortly before becoming Chief of Staff on the twenty-second, suggested that the Army’s how-to-fight Field Manual 100–5 needed to be revised, pointing out that the 1976 version had been written chiefly for battle in central Europe and was lacking in worldwide doctrinal application. One of the 47 Gibbs, “DRS,” pp. 36–40. 48 Knight, “DRS,” pp. 44–49; Stephen N. Magyera, Jr., “Troubleshooting the New Division Organization,” Military Review 57 (July 1977): 53–60; John W. Foss, Donald S. Pihl, and Thomas F. Fitzgerald, “The Division Restructur ing Study,” ibid. 57 (March 1977): 11–21; Gary M. Stallings, “TOPFORM: 3x8 Tactical Operations,” Field Artillery Journal, June 1988, pp. 49–51; FM 100–5, July 1976; FM 6–20, 30 Sep 1977. 49 John B. Gavalas, “Division 86,” Field Artillery Journal, March-April 1980, p. 25.
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The Organizational History of Field
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Civil War Flag (nonregulation), wit
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-P
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FOREWORD The Organizational History
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used to defend fixed positions. Thi
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CONTENTS Chapter Page 1. THE BEGINN
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Chapter xv Page ABBREVIATIONS AND A
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Chapter xvii Page Sound-ranging equ
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Field Artillery 1775-2003
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4 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of fie
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10 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of fi
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Regimental Staff Table 3—Artiller
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Battle of Palo Alto by Klauprecht &
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Table 6—Standard Field Pieces Use
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Table 8—Artillery Organization, A
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Table 9—Artillery Organization, A
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CHAPTER 4 Diverging Missions Betwee
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diverging missiOns tactics for infa
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diverging missiOns possibili ties o
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diverging missiOns The Gatling Guns
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diverging missiOns of War William C
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diverging missiOns high-angle fire
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Table 10—Artillery Organization,
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diverging missiOns Artillery in act
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diverging missiOns Artillery in act
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diverging missiOns Although neglect
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Direct Fire Gun A Aiming Point Diag
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100 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of f
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126 THE ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF F
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Table 11—Field Artillery Pieces R
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Table 12—Field Artillery Transpor
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CHAPTER 7 World War II Developments
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wOrld war ii 159 blow, and the thir
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wOrld war ii L-4 from the 29th Infa
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wOrld war ii 163 authorized six 105
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wOrld war ii Airborne troops loadin
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wOrld war ii 167 artillery battalio
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wOrld war ii Table 16—Principal A
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wOrld war ii Table 17—Nondivision
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wOrld war ii Destroyer Training Cen
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Firing 4.5-inch rockets in the Hür
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wOrld war ii 177 of division artil
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wOrld war ii 179 the for mer was pr
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wOrld war ii 15th Field Artillery O
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wOrld war ii as well, passed missio
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wOrld war ii 185 photographs), and
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wOrld war ii 187 After nearly six y
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CHAPTER 9 The Nuclear Arena The Kor
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The nUclear arena 211 time that rad
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The nUclear arena Honest John rocke
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The nUclear arena Corporal missile
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The nUclear arena 217 and firepower
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The nUclear arena 219 In light of n
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The nUclear arena 221 the missile c
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The nUclear arena Lacrosse missile
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The nUclear arena 225 cost over $10
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The nUclear arena his proposal the
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The nUclear arena Little John rocke
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The nUclear arena 231 fire it withi
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The nUclear arena 233 for rapid che
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The nUclear arena Lance missile 235
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The nUclear arena 237 By the end of
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The nUclear arena 239 In the late 1
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Table 23—Field Artillery Rockets
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CHAPTER 10 The Road to Flexible Res
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The rOad TO fleXiBle resPOnse 245 a
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Table 24—Comparison of Divisional
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The rOad TO fleXiBle resPOnse 249 p
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Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

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