Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

250 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
on 1 December, and Reorganization of the Current Infantry Division (ROCID) on
20 December. By the summer of 1958, all the divisions in the Regular Army had
been reorganized under the tables, and by the summer of the following year all but
one of the thirty-seven divisions in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard had
been reorganized. The final TOEs for the pentomic airborne organizations appeared
in 1958, but the final tables for the infantry and armored divisions were available
only in 1960. During the intervening years, pentomic con cepts underwent numerous
field tests, evaluations, and modi fica tions. 14
General Dahlquist had forwarded the CONARC proposal for a new airborne
divisional structure to the Army staff in late 1955, before the PENTANA army
study had been accepted. The proposed airborne division had features of both the
PENTANA and ATFA studies. Its field artillery battalion was to comprise three
105-mm. howitzer batteries, each authorized eight howitzers, and one Honest John
battery with four launchers. The Honest John rocket was to be an interim weapon for
the division, to be replaced by either the Little John or Lacrosse still being developed.
General Taylor approved the concept with some changes, including the addition of
two more howitzer batteries so that one battery could support each of the division’s
five battle groups (Chart 2). Each battery was reduced to five howitzers, for a total
of twenty-five in the division. Tests performed by the 101st Airborne Division in
late 1956 and early 1957 showed that a major weakness in the new structure was
the short range of the direct- and general-support cannon artillery. The test director,
Third Army commander Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Hickey, recommended that 155-mm.
howitzers replace the 105s and that four, not five, howitzer batteries be assigned
to the division. He argued that the fifth battle group in the division would be held
in reserve and, therefore, would not need additional support artillery. General
Dahlquist disagreed, proffering two recommendations: that the 105-mm. howitzer
be retained because it was lighter, more mobile, and air transportable and that the
number of howitzers in each battery be increased from five to six, for a total of
thirty in the divi sion. The final tables published in July 1958, however, specified
that each howitzer battery would remain with five 105-mm. howitzers, for a total
of twenty-five, and that the total aggregate strength of the airborne division artillery
would be 825, in comparison with its previous organization of seventy-two
howitzers and 3,249 personnel. 15
As with the airborne division, the proposed infantry division reflected the
pentagonal concept of five battle groups, each with its own mortar battery. The
division artillery, with an aggregate strength of 1,725, included a headquarters
14 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 276–84.
15 Ltr OPS–OT–DC–2, DCSOPS to CG, CONARC, 20 Feb 56, sub: Reorganization of the Airborne
Division; Ltr ATSWD–G 322/28 (Div), HQ, CONARC, to Comdts, Inf School, et al., 26 Nov 1955, sub:
Reorganization of the Airborne Division, Short Title: ROTAD; Ltr ATSWD 322/31 (Div), HQ, CONARC,
to CofS, 15 Dec 1955, sub: Reor ganization of the Airborne Division. All copies in CMH files. See also T.
L. Sherborne, “Reorganizing the 101st Airborne Division: An Interim Report,” Army Information Digest,
June 1957, pp. 12–23; TOE 6–200T, ROTAD, 10 Aug 1956; TOE 6–200D, 31 Jul 1958; TOE 6–200C,
14 Dec 1955; HQ, CONARC, “Summary of Major Events and Problems, 1 July 1956–30 June 1957,”
vol. 1, copy in CMH files (hereinafter CONARC, “Summary,” FY 1957).