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Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

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308 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry <strong>Of</strong> field arTillery<br />

HHB<br />

Chart 11—Light Division Artillery Organization, 1983<br />

DIV ARTY<br />

105-mm.<br />

HOW BN<br />

(Towed)<br />

Note: The 155-mm. howitzer battery was not authorized for the airborne and air assault divisions.<br />

of the divisions was to have no more than 12,700 soldiers and be transportable in<br />

fewer than five hundred airlifts. 65<br />

Originally approved under the Division 86 concept, the armored and mechanized<br />

infantry (heavy) division were restructured rather than redesigned, the main objective<br />

being to lighten the divisions by about 2,000 soldiers. The 8-inch self-propelled<br />

howitzer bat talion was moved to the corps level, sound-and-flash platoons were<br />

eliminated from the target acquisition battery, howitzer crews were reduced, and<br />

rocket batteries were added. The AOE heavy division artillery thus comprised a<br />

headquarters and headquarters battery, a target acquisition battery, three 155-mm.<br />

self-propelled howitzer battalions (three batteries each, with eight howitzers in<br />

each battery), and a rocket battery for general support (Chart 12). The 2d Infantry<br />

Division in Korea was to have a structure tailored for its mission based on the AOE<br />

standard heavy division artillery. The 9th Infantry Division was also authorized a<br />

specially tailored structure. 66<br />

Although the 8-inch howitzer had a slow rate of fire and low survivability, its<br />

transfer to the corps eliminated the division’s primary tactical nuclear capability<br />

and to a large extent reduced its counterfire capability. United States <strong>Army</strong> Europe<br />

planners argued that the howitzers should be retained in the divisions because of<br />

the superiority in numbers of Warsaw Pact artillery pieces and that the reduction of<br />

tubes at the division level would aggravate an already inferior position. A reduction<br />

in the number of crew members for the 155-mm. howitzer increased the time needed<br />

to emplace and displace the pieces, and it diminished crew flexibility. Deletion of<br />

the sound-and-flash platoon eliminated the division’s only capability for passive<br />

65 Voigt, “Much Ado,” pp. 28–30.<br />

66 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, p. 401; Romjue, <strong>Army</strong> of Excellence, p. 49.<br />

155-mm.<br />

HOW BTRY<br />

(Towed)

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