Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

140 THE ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF FIELD ARTILLERY
being altered for both aerial and ground fire. The modernization was considered so
successful that plans were made to equip all active divisional 75-mm. gun batteries
with new carriages by the end of fiscal year 1937. The 155-mm. howitzer was also
being modernized with a new carriage for high-speed towing. 31
For pack artillery, a 75-mm. howitzer was being developed, and in 1931 the
1st Battalion, 2d Field Artillery, in the Canal Zone was equipped with the new
weapon. The piece received high praise, and other roles were contemplated for
it: as a supporting weapon in the experimental mechanized cavalry force; as the
accompanying weapon in the infantry division; and as the principal weapon in the
cavalry division. 32
Organizational Developments
During World War I the roles and missions of coast and field artillery became
blurred, leading to controversy immediately after the war. Throughout the interwar
period, the issue of branch consolidation was argued, chiefly because of reduced
appropriations. Those who favored consolidation believed that the coast artillery
and fixed defenses were obsolete and could easily be sacrificed; those against felt
that the coast artillery’s defensive mission and field artillery’s offensive mission
were diametrically opposed to each other and that the need for harbor defenses was
genuine and important, given the ineffectiveness as well as high cost of protection
provided by aircraft and naval vessels. 33
Early postwar reports did not indicate the necessity for drastically changing the
organizational structure of the divisional field artillery. The major recommenda tions
included reorgan izing the three-battalion 155-mm. howitzer regiment into two battalions
for tactical reasons (so that each infantry brigade could be supported by one
regiment of light artillery and one battalion of 155-mm. howit zers), for economy
(through the elimination of one battalion staff), and for simplification of liaison.
Other changes included substituting a lighter weapon for the 155-mm. howitzer,
eliminating the trench mortar battery from the brigade and centralizing all divisional
trench mortar batteries in the general headquarters (GHQ) reserve, reorganizing the
battery combat trains into ammunition bat teries and battalions, and assigning the
artillery ammu nition train and mobile ordnance repair shop to the division brigade.
Organic army artillery was considered unnecessary, and suggestions were made
that artillery not in divisions or corps be organized into a general artillery reserve.
The army artillery staff would then be reduced to a small tactical one. It was also
31 Mins 15639, Ordnance Cmte, 20 Feb 40, Meeting no. 8, box 77, Entry 885, RG 156, NARA;
Sunderland, Field Artillery School, p. 130. See also in NARA, RG 407, file 319.12, Annual Rpts, CofFA:
FY1930, pp. 13–14, box 1336, Entry 37g; FY1931, pp. 13–14, box 370, Entry 37i; FY1932, p. 13, box
1332, Entry 37g; FY1933, p. 10, box 1331, Entry 37g; FY1934, pp. 61, 73, box 1329, Entry 37g; and
suppl. to FY1935, pp. 1–2, box 370, Entry 37i.
32 Annual Rpt, CofFA, FY1931, p. 13, file 319.12, box 370, Entry 37i, RG 407, NARA.
33 Larry H. Addington, “The U.S. Coast Artillery and the Problem of Artillery Organization, 1907–
1954,” Military Affairs 40 (February 1976): 1–6.