Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

316 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
31-man fire-support element for Third, Seventh, and Eighth Armies, as well as staff
elements at the Army component and joint forces headquarters. Manning levels for
the existing fire-support elements at brigade, division, and task force echelons also
appeared inadequate for continuous and split operations. 14
Other problems appeared in the area of target acquisition. The Firefinder radars—
AN/TPQ–36 (countermortar) and the larger AN/TPQ–37 (counterartillery)—had
been introduced in the 1980s utilizing technology from the 1960s. The radars could
locate hostile indirect-fire weapons 20–25 kilometers (12.4–15.5 miles) away within
a 100-meter (328-foot) accuracy, but lacked sufficient range, mobility, and processing
power; 15 the AN/TPQ–36, in particular, often acquired false targets. 16 Many
thought that in addition to the counterfire radars unmanned aerial vehicles, such as
those used by the British, would have provided artillery the ability to acquire targets
before enemy guns fired. 17 Operations also substantiated the need for field artillery
observation helicopters to acquire targets and mark them for Copperhead munitions.
But helicopters in Desert st o r m were almost always in use for division aviation to
designate targets with the laser-guided HELLFIRE (helicopter-launched fire and
forget) missile system, thus limiting their use by field artillery. 18
Elements of a forward corps support battalion provided supplies and maintenance,
as well as other support, for field artillery brigades during De s e r t st o r m.
Problems appeared in repairing equipment as the battalion had had limited experience
in supporting artillery brigades in peacetime. Also the battalion was usually
positioned too far to the rear to provide adequate timely support. In short, new
systems that allowed for greater dispersion on the battlefield and that increased
firepower (more ammunition required) and mobility also placed greater demands
on the support system. 19
Reorganizing the Force
A by-product of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in
1991 was numerous regional threats from the emerging nations. Where the United
States once faced a unified threat with a policy of containment, the focus became
one of responding to a broad variety of contingencies. To fight a major land war, the
Army’s forces had been forward deployed and structured for conventional warfare
under a doctrine of attrition and annihilation. The reduction of the Soviet threat, as
14 Klein, “Building Down,” pp. 37–39; Jay F. Grandin, “Fire Support Coordination,” Field Artillery,
February 1992, pp. 19–23; USAFAC/Fort Sill Annual Command History, 1991, pp. 205–06, FA
School files; Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle, pp. 58–59.
15 Robert M. Hill, “Future Watch,” Field Artillery, January-February 1996, p. 19; Mark Conrad,
“Firefinder,” ibid., January-February 1997, pp. 40–41.
16 John Dornstadter, Maurice F. Posmanick, and David M. Patterson, “Mirages in the Desert,”
Field Artillery, February 1992, pp. 17–18.
17 Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle, p. 60.
18 Ibid., p. 61.
19 Mark L. Morrison, “A Modest Proposal,” Field Artillery, April 1995, p. 31; Schubert and Kraus,
eds., Whirlwind War, p. 176; USAFAC/Fort Sill Annual Command History, 1991, pp. 206–07, FA
School files.