Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

320 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
Nevertheless, some qualitative differences were evident. The ratio of artillery
pieces to U.S. tanks and infantry fighting vehicles was the same or higher than in
De s e r t st o r m, for the initial phase of ir a q i Fr e e D o m was won with fewer divisions.
In fact, the Army used the lowest ratio of field artillery pieces to troops in combat
since World War I. In the main combat operations of March and April 2003, the
Army field artillery contingent consisted of one corps artillery headquarters, two
division artillery headquarters, three brigade headquarters, and eleven battalions.
Each of the cannon and rocket launchers delivered a greater volume and higher rates
of fire than in De s e r t st o r m. 28 Field artillery once again proved itself, operating
in the worst weather, including a severe sandstorm that stopped most other means
of fire. 29
Following De s e r t st o r m, the Army had made concerted efforts toward digitization
in its Force XXI designs. Field artillery had previously led the way in its
adoption of a computerized tactical fire control system, referred to as TACFIRE,
and by 2003, Army units were interconnected with digital networks allowing for
much improved communications and situational awareness. Using digital means,
field artillery units could routinely deliver firepower within two minutes. 30
The battle saw the debut of the ATACMS’s unitary missile, a missile using GPS
for guidance, having a maximum range of 270 kilometers (167.8 miles) and a low
circular error probable, and dispersing over 400 improved conventional munition
bomblets over a wide area. The missile was effective against personnel and lightly
armored targets, as well as in attacking long-range command-and-control targets. 31
Other “firsts” were the combat use of the M109A6 Paladin 155-mm. self-propelled
howitzer, the high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS), search and destroy
armor munitions (SADARM), and the Bradley fire-support vehicle, all earning
high marks from artillerymen in Iraq. 32 Although Iraqi artillery systems compared
reasonably well with those of the coalition forces, they rarely were effective because
the Iraqis were deficient in their ability to acquire targets. With their superiority in
this area, the coalition forces were often able to destroy enemy artillery before it
could be a real threat. 33
27 Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., Combat
Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp. 95, 108, 117, 167, 179, 184, 201, 261, 263, 264–65, 273, 274–75,
287, 289, 297, 313, 316, 376, 398.
28 Michael D. Maples, “FA Priorities After OIF,” Field Artillery, September-October 2003, p. 5;
William G. Pitts, “Overview,” ibid., p. 2.
29 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, p. 201; Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr.,
The Iraq War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 2003), pp. 67–68; Interv, Patrecia
Slayden Hollis with Lt Gen W. Scott Wallace, in “Trained, Adaptable, Flexible Forces = Victory in
Iraq,” Field Artillery, September-October 2003, p. 8; Interv, idem with Brig Gen Lloyd J. Austin III,
in “3d ID in OIF,” ibid., p. 12.
30 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, pp. 416–17.
31 Ibid., p. 95; Pitts, “Overview,” p. 2.
32 Pitts, “Overview,” p. 4; “3d ID in OIF,” pp. 11–12; Robert W. Rooker, “Historical Recounting
of Marne Thunder in OIF,” Field Artillery, September-October 2003, p. 18; Richard R. Aaron, Jr.,
“3d ID BFIST in OIF,” ibid., January-February 2004, p. 20; Interv, Patrecia Slayden Hollis with Lt
Gen Victor E. Renuart, Jr., in “OIF Hallmarks,” ibid., March-June 2004, p. 5.
33 Murray and Scales, Iraq War, pp. 263–65; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, p. 441.