Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

186 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
during the interwar years proved basically sound and were generally followed by
all Army and Marine field artillery units in Europe and the Pacific. 59
The high degree of centralized con trol reached during the war permitted maximum
use of prearranged fire. Divis ion artil lery was most effective against enemy
infantry in the open, and secondly in blinding enemy observation, preventing the
movement of reserve troops, and assisting in counterbattery fire. Continuous fire
was always possible by moving only part of the artillery, keeping the rest firing in
positions until the displacing batteries were ready to resume action. The heavier
corps and army artillery reinforced the divisions and provided their conventional
roles of counterbattery fire, interdiction mis sions, destruction of hostile defenses,
and fire on rear areas. As General Hodges later remarked, “Of the principal arms
that could be brought to bear directly on the enemy, infantry, armor, and air were
seriously handicapped by the weather and terrain. Through all, however—day and
night, good weather and bad—the flexibil ity and power of our modern artil lery
were applied unceasingly.” 60
When lack of time precluded use of prearranged fire, it was necessary to develop
a rapid means of massing all available firepower. While there were several
procedures, the most common was the “serenade.” Only corps, divi sion, or group
artillery commanders could authorize sere nades, which were controlled entirely
by radio. Commanders had to ensure that the target warranted the expendi ture of
ammunition and that the map location of the target was accurate enough to achieve
the desired result. Missions were fired “when ready,” or a time was designated for
all battalions to fire on a target simultaneously. A better known method was “time
on target” (TOT). Procedures were similar to those of the sere nade, but the missions
were con trolled chiefly by telephone, and the rounds for all units were to land on
the target at the same time. The TOT required frequent synchronization of time and
the determina tion of flight time for all projectiles. 61
The introduction of the proximity fuze, commonly referred to as the pozit or
VT (var iable time) fuze, during the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in
Decem ber 1944 greatly increased the effec tive ness of artillery fire. Unlike a time
fuze, it required no setting and contained a tiny electronic device that caused the
shell to explode when it came near the target. Although employed more extensively
by antiaircraft artillery, it was used by field artillery to burst shells at an ideal height
over enemy trenches and foxholes. Considerable concern was expressed because of
the danger to air observation posts, and its use was restricted to daylight hours. 62
59 USFET Study no. 64, pp. 21–23, copy in CMH files; del Valle, “Marine Field Artillery,” pp. 722–33;
“How It Actually Works Out,” Field Artillery Journal, February 1943, p. 128; H. S. Dillingham and J. O.
Hoenigsberg, “Fire Direction Must Be Flexible,” ibid., July 1944, pp. 457–58. Almost all Field Artillery
Journal articles written by officers between 1941 and 1945 on their war experiences praised the teachings
of the Field Artillery School in fire direction techniques and commented on their value in the war effort.
60 General Courtney H. Hodges quoted in Joseph R. Reeves, “Artillery in the Ardennes,” Field Artillery
Journal, March 1946, p. 138 (sidebar).
61 USFET Study no. 64, pp. 24–26, copy in CMH files.
62 Ibid., pp. 26–27, and Study no. 67, p. 7, copies in CMH files. For the development of the VT fuze,
see Ralph B. Baldwin, The Deadly Fuze (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1980).