Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

138 THE ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF FIELD ARTILLERY
a Mark VII mount, comparing its performance with that of a horse-drawn M1897
75-mm. gun and with the horse-drawn M1902 3-inch gun. The school found the
mobility of the self-propelled gun equal to that of the horse-drawn pieces, but its
mechanical reliability low. The report con cluded by stating that “. . . the self-propelled
mount tested is unserviceable and unsuitable as an accompanying gun or for
any other purpose. Nevertheless, the basic ideas embodied have much merit and
are entitled to further con sidera tion.” 27
When the second test was over, General MacArthur declared that each of the
arms and services should adopt mechanization and motorization and conduct research
and experiments as were necessary to that end. By 1933, when a third effort
to organize a combined arms mechanized force was made at Fort Knox, Kentucky,
the artillery still had no self-propelled weapons. In 1934, the 1st Battalion, 68th
Field Artillery, was activated with two firing batteries at Fort Knox to support the
1st Cavalry, Mechanized. Initially truck-drawn and armed with 75-mm. guns, the
battalion was later issued 75-mm. howitzers and half-track prime movers, thus
improving its mobility considerably. In 1937, the battalion was increased with the
addition of two more firing batteries. But this battalion was the only mechanized
field artillery unit in the Army when war broke out again in Europe in 1939. 28
Advances in Materiel
The goal of mobility heavily influenced the development of weapons. The
Westervelt board had recommended six basic types of field pieces: one gun and
one howitzer for each of the categories of light, medium, and heavy artillery. As
a basic principle, the board had suggested that the weapons be mobile enough to
accompany the infantry and stated a preference for one type that could accomplish
all the requirements of divisional artillery. Because such a solution was impractical
at the time, consideration was given to substituting a light field howitzer, such as a
105-mm., for the 155-mm. howitzer in the division. Artillery was supposed to be
sufficient ly mobile to support the infantry with continuous fire, its primary objective
being to neutralize the infantry of the opposing forces. The immediate targets were
those obstacles preventing the advance of the friendly infantry. Close contact with
the supported infan try, forward displacement with reasonable facility, and suffi cient
ammunition supply were necessary to accomplish the task. For these objectives, the
155-mm. howitzer was too heavy. The board felt that a lighter howitzer would be
especially suited for wooded areas and ravines, that it would be the best weapon for
27 Annual Rpt, CofFA, FY1930, pp. 12, 15, file 319.12, box 1336, Entry 37g, RG 407, NARA;
Sunderland, Field Artillery School, p. 130 (quoted words).
28 Ltr, AG 320.2 (8-16-33) (Misc) M–E (WPD) 3561–27, 18 Aug 33, sub: Development of Four
Army Organization, CMH files; Ltr, AG 320.2 FA (12-26-33), 26 Oct 34, sub: Reorganization of the
Field Artillery, CMH files; Ltr, AG 320.2 (4-26-37), 10 Sep 37, referenced in 68th Armored FA Bn fldr,
CMH files.