Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

POsTwar reOrganizaTiOn
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bat teams and always augmented with artillery, fought aggres sively and caused
large groups of the enemy to be isolated, thus providing lucrative artillery targets.
Medium and heavy artil lery were kept well forward, and they employed harassing
and interdicting fire with great effect. Enemy prisoners confirmed that the incessant
bombardment of artillery had inflicted heavy casualties, greatly eroding their
morale and fighting ability. 29
During the Soyang battle, the equivalent of twenty artillery battalions fired
381,136 rounds from 17 to 26 May, more than 17,400 tons of ammunition. In
comparison, thirty-five battalions at Bastogne from 22 to 31 December 1944 fired
only 94,230 rounds. Artillery expenditures went even higher the following summer,
and commanders began to make charges of waste. Army Chief of Staff General J.
Lawton Collins reported that artillery expenditures from June 1950 to 31 December
1952 equaled that shot during all of World War II in the Mediterranean and Pacific
theaters combined. All told, American artillery fired more than 600,000 tons of
105-mm. ammunition, more than 300,000 tons of 155-mm. ammunition, and more
than 75,000 tons of 8-inch howitzer ammunition during that eighteen-month period
in Korea. 30
From October 1951 until near the end of the war in July 1953, the static nature
of the war tested the field artillery’s weapons and equipment under conditions
similar to those of World War I. Both sides occupied fortified positions, and both
forces grew in strength. Ammunition expenditures increased as greater emphasis
was placed on disruptive and defensive artillery fire. Because more harassing and
interdicting fire was needed to keep the enemy from operating closer to the front,
the day of supply again had to be raised. Increased demands on stockpiles and the
knowledge that there was no possibility of replenishing the heavy consumption of
artillery rounds until late in 1952 or early 1953 caused much concern. Also, enemy
artillery strength grew progressively after the war stabilized in 1951. On 1 October
1951, the field artillery pieces in the United Nations Command numbered 1,050,
while it was estimated that the enemy had only 530 pieces. On 1 July 1953, the
command’s field artillery pieces numbered 1,862, while the estimate of enemy field
pieces had risen to 1,570, an increase of 196 percent. The enemy’s supply system,
ammunition stockpiles, and firing techniques also improved sig nificantly during
the stalemate. 31
The condition of the huge amounts of ammunition left over from World War
II also contributed to the problem. At the end of the war, the United States had a
29 “Battle of the Soyang River: An Analysis of Artillery Support, X Corps Sector, 1 May–29 May
1951,” pp. 6–7, copy in CMH files.
30 Ibid., annex to Encl 4, copy in CMH files. Army artillery units included eight 105-mm. howitzer
battalions, four 155-mm. howitzer battalions, two 8-inch howitzer batteries, and two 155-mm. gun batteries.
The 11th Marine Regiment (three 105-mm. howitzer and one 155-mm. howitzer battalions) plus
a 4.5-inch rocket battery also participated in the battle. Two 105-mm. howitzer battalions from the ROK
Army were also present. See Huston, Sinews of War, pp. 631–32; Hearings on Ammunition Supplies in
the Far East, 1953, p. 75.
31 Hermes, Truce Tent, pp. 225, 510; “Employment and Effectiveness of the Artillery With the Eighth
Army,” p. ix and app. I, p. 42, copy in CMH files.