Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

258 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
the simplic ity, homogeneity, versatility, and flexibility required by the Army for
its diverse, worldwide tasks in the coming decade.” 23
At the same time, General Eddleman directed CONARC to prepare another
study to develop infantry, armored, and mechanized divisional organizations for the
1961–65 period. He stated that the creation of a mechanized division might enhance
battlefield mobility and afford a greater degree of protection for personnel on the
atomic battlefield. Echelons above the division level were not to be considered. The
CONARC study was revolutionary, going beyond a mere modification of the existing
pentomic structure with an Army-wide reorganization under the new concept
known simply as ROAD (Reorganization Objective Army Divisions). Secretary of
the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., approved ROAD in April 1961. 24
The pentomic structure had been based on the premise that nuclear warfare
would be the most likely form of war in the future and that tactical nuclear weapons
would be used. In contrast, the ROAD concept was designed to be flexible enough
to handle both a nuclear threat and limited conflicts short of nuclear war. The pentomic
organization had been part of the Army’s effort to find a place within the
framework of national policy in the 1950s; the ROAD structure was a reflection of
the new administration’s theory of flexible response.
Each of the brigades (usually three) in a ROAD division contained from
two to five maneuver battalions, with the brigade being a tactical unit with no
administrative role. As part of the division base, the infantry division artillery
returned to a format similar to that in the old triangular division but retained its
nuclear capabil ity. Besides the head quarters and headquarters battery, the division
artillery consisted of three self-propelled 105-mm. howitzer battalions (one
in direct support of each of the division’s three combat brigades), an Honest John
battalion of four launchers, and a composite general-support battalion of 155-mm.
and 8-inch howitzers, also self-propelled. Army Chief of Staff General George
H. Decker approved the tables in April 1961, but he also asked CONARC to consider
not only using towed artillery rather than self-propelled weapons but also
reorganizing the rocket battalion to include the 8-inch howitzer battery. Towed
weapons replaced the self-propelled ones in the final tables, with the composite
battalion remaining as previously planned. The final tables also consolidated the
service and headquarters batteries in the battalion. These tables, published in July
1963 (Chart 6), authorized the infantry division artillery an aggregate strength of
2,516 and fifty-four 105-mm. howitzers, eighteen 155-mm. howitzers, four 8-inch
howitzers, and four 762-mm. rocket launchers (Honest Johns). 25 Overall, there
was a 17-percent increase in conventional firepower. The addition of ten obser-
23 Ltr CS 320 (13 Dec 60), VCofS to CG, CONARC, 16 Dec 1960, sub: Reorganization of Infantry
and Armored Divisions and Creation of a Mechanized Division; “Modern Mobile Army, 1965–1970,
Short Title: MOMAR I” (Fort Monroe, Va.: Headquarters, Continental Army Command, 1960). Both
copies in CMH files. See also George T. Metcalf, “Trends in Organization of the Field Army,” Armor,
September-October 1960, pp. 27–31; Gordon B. Rogers, “Ground Mobility,” ibid., pp. 24–26.
24 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 293–96, 298.
25 TOE 6–100E (draft), undated; TOE 6–100E, 15 Jul 1963; Ltr ATCG 322 (Div), CG, CONARC to
CofS, 1 Mar 1961, sub: Reorganization Objective Army Divisions 1961–1965, copy in CMH files.