Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

TOward a new cenTUry
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heavy divisions thus fell from seventy-two to fifty-four. The six-gun batteries
allowed the Army National Guard to modernize its artillery with the Paladin in
a more timely fashion, and it allowed more Paladin battalions to be organized.
At the same time, the MLRS battery and target acquisition battery were replaced
in the heavy division by a “command and attack battalion,” each containing a
combined headquarters and service battery, two rocket batteries (each with nine
launchers), and a target acquisition battery equipped with Firefinder radars. The
new battalion increased the division’s organic fire support and provided more
control to the formerly separate batteries. Another advantage of doubling the
number of rocket launchers was that the division artillery could provide the
direct-support battalions with reinforcing rocket platoons and still have rockets
available for general support. 24
These changes were in line with the interim Division XXI designs. While the
Army of Excellence (AOE) division had been structured to conduct separate deep
and rear operations to defeat the enemy in a close maneuver fight, Division XXI
was organized to attack the enemy simultaneously throughout the battle space. The
AOE division was designed to fight in mass, Division XXI to fight in a decentralized
pattern. The division as a whole was to comprise 15,820 soldiers and have
two reinforcing field artillery brigades supporting it, at least one of which was to
come from the National Guard. Each brigade was to have one battalion of eighteen
155-mm. self-propelled howitzers and two MLRS battalions, each with twentyseven
launchers. Thus thirty-six 155-mm. howitzers and one hundred eight rocket
launchers would reinforce each heavy division. 25
Return to Iraq
After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States and its allies invaded
Afghanistan, relying on special operation forces and airpower with precisionguided
munitions rather than field artillery. Many, however, felt this was a serious
error, 26 and two years later during Operation ira q i Fr e e D o m field artillery troops
were included as part of the force. The Army followed traditional practice, with
direct-support battalions fighting alongside their respective brigades. Battalions
from corps and division levels provided general support. 27
24 Timothy P. Goldfish, “FA’s New Command and Attack Battalion,” Field Artillery, September-
October 1997, pp. 38–41; Randall L. Rigby, “3x6 Cannon—2x9 MLRS Transition,” ibid., September-
October 1996, pp. 18–21.
25 Randall L. Rigby, “Fires for Division XXI,” Field Artillery, November-December 1995, pp.
1–5; David P. Valcourt and Lester C. Jauron, “Division Redesign,” Field Artillery, July-August 1997,
pp. 24–31; Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 425–26.
26 Joshua D. Mitchell, “A Case for Howitzers in Afghanistan,” Field Artillery,
November-December 2003, pp. 6–9; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 425–27, 439–40. A
few howitzers were later deployed. See Dennis D. Tewksbury and Joel E. Hamby, “Decentralized
Fires in Afghanistan,” Field Artillery, November–December 2003, pp. 10–15; James A. Sink, “First
Lethal FA Fires in Afghanistan,” ibid., pp. 16–19; and Field Artillery in Military Operations Other
Than War (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp. 36–40.