Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

158 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
In January, the committee that had been planning the divisional reorgan ization
prompted the Chief of Field Artillery, General Danford, to send questionnaires to
each of the five triangular divisions, in part to determine the wartime production
of the 75-mm. gun and the proper armament for the division artil lery. About 75
percent of the officers answering the question naire wanted to eliminate the 75-mm.
gun from the division, their most frequent suggestion being a mixture of 105- and
155-mm. how itzers. Their reasons for desiring the 105/155 combina tion were much
the same as those advanced by the Field Artillery School in 1938. Both the staff and
officers opined that the 105’s small gain in mobil ity did not offset the sacrifice in
firepower and that the 155 needed to be retained as a general-support weapon for
increased fire power and for counterbattery fire. 3
By May 1940, the Germans had taken over Norway, Belgium, and Holland.
The Allies, both in Europe and elsewhere in the world, begged the United States
to furnish weapons and supplies. When the president and Congress included the
75-mm. guns as surplus items that were available for distribution, the Army protested,
declaring that if war were to come soon the 75-mm. gun was the only plentiful
weapon available. But manufactur ing more 75-mm. guns, weapons that had been
in use over forty years, was not the answer. After maneuvers had been held in April
and May, field artillery officers almost unanimously recommended removing the
75-mm. gun from the division artillery and substituting the 105-mm. howitzer. On
27 June, two days after Germany concluded an armis tice with France, the General
Staff G–3 made the decision to reorganize the division artillery with a headquarters
and headquarters battery and four battalions —three for direct support with 105-mm.
howitzers and one for general support with 155-mm. howitzers. The War Department
issued the reorganization orders for nine triangular divisions on 10 September, and
tables of organization were published in October. Although the divisions continued
to use the 75-mm. gun until the 105-mm. howitzers became available (which did
not occur on any large scale until 1943), the era of the 75-mm. gun in the division
ended. As the principal light field artil lery piece in the infantry division during the
war, the 105-mm. howitzer provided a high rate of fire, a projectile more powerful
than that of the 75-mm. gun, good mobility, and a trajectory sufficient to fire over
personnel and tanks while in close support. 4
The reorganization of 1940 greatly reduced the size of the division artillery. In
comparison to the old square division (17,609 officers and men) and its field artillery
brigade (aggregate strength of 4,363 with seventy-two weapons), the new triangular
division had 14,811 officers and men and its artillery an aggregate strength of
2,685 with forty-eight howitzers. Its artillery battalions, with their more powerful
weapons, were more maneuverable than the old regiments had been and were easier
to control. The division commander could now organize three indi vidual combat
teams, each with an infantry regiment, a field artillery battalion, and other supporting
elements. One regiment and its supporting units could assault and fix the enemy in
posi tion, one could maneuver around the fixed enemy in order to strike a decisive
3 Janice E. McKenney, “More Bang for the Buck in the Interwar Army,” Military Affairs 42 (April
1978): 80–86.
4 Ibid.