Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

206 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
A complete system of fortified observation posts stretched out across the front,
with the forward observer bunkers usually adjacent to the bunker of the supported infantry
company commander. Fire missions were commonly initiated by coordinates,
and the time to compute and transmit data after target identification by the observer
varied, normally between one and three minutes, depending upon the ability and
experience of the observer. The scarcity of targets of opportunity led to greater use
of photo interpretation to develop targets for observed fire, and in most divisional
and corps fire direction centers, the photo interpreter teams worked around the clock.
As in World War II, light aircraft played an important part in artillery operations,
and air surveillance of the battlefield was continuous during day light hours, weather
permit ting. The division artillery aircraft were used for close-in surveillance, while
corps artillery aircraft operated through out the depth of enemy artillery positions.
Difficult terrain and lack of visibility across much of the front hampered survey
operations, but the static nature of the war during the last two years permitted the
eventual estab lishment of excellent survey control. Little stress was placed on target
area survey, for the few point targets visible from observation posts were fired on
with enough frequency to estab lish adjusted coordinates. Artillerymen usually tried
to select and check registration points that would be identifiable on a map. When
they did not wish to use an identifi able point, the target was usually assigned map
coordinates based on aerial photo graphs. The emphasis on map coordinates was
probably jus tified in spite of numerous indications of map inaccuracies, and these
inaccuracies seriously affected only a small percentage of artillery fires. 36
Europe and the “New Look”
The Korean War was a limited conflict for which the Army never fully mobilized.
Moreover, the partial mobilization that did occur was aimed primarily at
placing the United States and its allies in a better position to contain Soviet and
Chinese ambitions world wide. The emphasis on rearmament was on preparing for
the defense of Europe, where the nation believed the chief threat to be. For operations
in Korea, money, manpower, and materiel were provided on an ad hoc basis,
with after-the-fact budgeting that furnished supplements each year to take care of
replacing expended materiel. Budgets prepared for fiscal years 1952, 1953, and 1954
were each based on the assumption that the war would end during the respective
year and were developed for meeting the specific goals recommended by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in 1951 to quell the worldwide Communist threat. 37
Forces committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed
in 1949, were the foundation of European defense, but in 1950 the Allied strength
in Europe equaled only seven combat divisions, two of them American (counting
the constabulary as a division). The outbreak of war in Korea stimulated a growth
36 Ibid., pp. 9–13, 17–18, copy in CMH files.
37 Robert W. Coakley, Karl E. Cocke, and Daniel P. Griffin, “Demobilization Following the Korean
War,” OCMH Study no. 29, p. 1, copy in CMH files.