Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

280 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
Riverine 105-mm. howitzer battery
position, with the fire direction center
on the center right barge
artillery raids involved the displacement
of field pieces to supplementary
firebases or firebases selected and occupied
on the spur of the moment. To
achieve surprise, the maneuver forces
supporting the artillery conducted their
operations as quickly as possible, while
taking the utmost advantage of airmobility,
aerial observation, and target
acquisi tion capabilities. The artillery
raid became increasingly important as
the number of artillery organizations
decreased in late 1969 and 1970, thus
forcing the remaining units to cover
larger areas of operation. 24
Harassing and interdiction fire
received conflicting comments on its
effectiveness. Some officers felt that
such fire had little effect on the enemy,
while expending enormous amounts of
ammunition. Others disagreed, citing
reports that the enemy feared artillery
firing at night and that the fire was
indeed inflicting damage. In late 1968,
a program of intelligence and interdiction
fire was introduced, thus reducing
harassing and interdiction fire missions.
Targets for harassing and interdiction
fire were usually based on map recon naissance alone, while some type of enemy
intelligence had to justify the use of the less arbitrary intelligence and interdiction
fire. Artillerymen used the time-on-target technique, so familiar during World War
II, to execute the intelligence and interdiction fire missions more effec tively. 25
Tube artillery firepower proved extremely effective and efficient in Vietnam.
Still, some felt that aerial gunships and fixed-wing aircraft were preferable because
their pilots could see the targets and then sweep down and strike. In contrast, the
artillery depended heavily upon ground and aerial observers for accuracy. However,
artillery fire was often available on a 24-hour basis, including periods of poor
visibility when gunships and fixed-wing aircraft could operate only with severe
restric tions imposed. 26
Forward observers in Vietnam, “the eyes and ears of artillery,” were usually
flexible and ingenious enough to handle the difficult and unusual situations that
24 ACTIV Final Rpt, October 1969, ann. F, copy in MHI files; Ott, Field Artillery, pp. 184–87.
25 ACTIV Final Rpt, October 1969, pp. 4-22 to 4-26, copy in MHI files; Ott, Field Artillery, pp.
187–88; Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 99–100.
26 “Eyes of Artillery,” Octofoil, July-August-September 1969, pp. 3–5.