Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

236 The OrganizaTiOnal hisTOry Of field arTillery
The Army, at the time the Lance was adopted, did not have congressional
approval to develop conventional warheads for the missile. With the replacement
of the Honest John, NATO lost a certain degree of its conventional firepower.
The major objection to equip ping the Lance with a conventional warhead was
its cost effectiveness. Those who favored the nonnuclear Lance pointed out that
the alter native, close-support aircraft in a sophisticated air defense environment,
required very expensive aircraft and highly skilled pilots; that the availability of
close-support aircraft might not be immediately responsive to the ground force
commander; and that, with an extremely limited peacetime force, Lance personnel
might be of no tactical use during the critical early stages of a conflict prior to the
initiation of nuclear warfare. Also, six battalions were already in place in Europe. The
added expense of providing them with the ICM (improved conven tional muni tions)
warhead appeared to furnish a good conven tional capability with a relatively low
increase in cost. Possible conventional warheads under considera tion were the Air
Force’s cluster bomblet for use against high-priority stationary targets; a terminally
guided submissile warhead that could seek, track, and destroy armor; a terminally
guided “smart” version that could employ semiactive laser guidance for pinpoint
accuracy; and a mine-dispensing area warhead that could block enemy approach
routes and deny access to specific areas of the battle field. 66
Congress approved the procurement of the first nonnuclear Lance materiel for the
Army in 1976 with delivery scheduled for the summer of 1978. When firing the conventional
cluster bomblet warhead, based on the Air Force’s design, the maximum
range of the Lance was 75 kilometers (46.6 miles). The nonnuclear Lance provided
the only means for a corps to attack targets beyond cannon range with a conventional
warhead. The dual capability increased flexibility. By launching conventional strikes
against the enemy’s second-echelon and rear-support areas, the corps commander
could add depth to the battlefield and relieve the burden of the frontline maneuver
and conventional artillery units. The multiple bomblets were particularly effec tive
against soft targets, such as surface-to-air missile sites, communications centers,
command posts, forward airfields, large reserve troop concentrations, and logistical
areas. On the minus side, the dual capability of the Lance program turned the missile
into a much larger and more expensive system than originally planned because of
the heavier payload necessary for the nonnuclear warhead, and it was questionable,
in view of the Lance’s weapon delivery error, if it really had offered a respectable
conventional option. In sum, its development was a long delayed process, ending
in a compromise weapon that did not completely satisfy anyone. 67
65 Laudati, “Lance,” pp. 14–17; Andrews, “Pending Lance,” p. 20; “The Lance Tactical Missile,”
International Defense Review, April 1973, pp. 199–203; Lee O. Ringham, “Lance,” Field Artilleryman,
August 1971, pp. 4–11; and AMC Annual His torical Summary for FY 1966, pp. 57–63, FY 1967, pp.
50–59, FY 1968, pp. 39–44, FY 1969, pp. 31–34, FY 1971, pp. 31–38, and FY 1972, pp. 25–30, AMCOM
files and copies in CMH files. The manufacturer’s advertisements called for a six-man crew.
66 AMC Annual Historical Summary for FY 1972, p. 28, and FY 1974, pp. 59–60, plus Annual Rpt of
Major Activities, FY 1973, pp. 39–40, AMCOM files and copies in CMH files; “Lance Tactical Missile,”
pp. 199–203; Jim Rabon, “Lance,” Field Artillery Journal, March-April 1974, pp. 8–10.