Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

The nUclear arena
219
In light of nuclear weapons, jet
aircraft, and ballistic missiles, one
assumption open to question was that
the Army’s combat zone would be
limited to 100 miles (160.9 kilometers)
forward and back of the front line. The
Army planned to disperse its forward
forces widely until ready to strike, mass
quickly for the attack, and then rapidly
disperse again before the enemy could
retali ate. Under such a scenario, the
depth of the battle area would certainly
exceed 200 miles (321.8 kilometers).
Also, if nuclear weapons were used,
it could be expected that each side
might hold sizable pockets in each
other’s area, resulting in a much deeper
combat zone and in an extremely hazy
battle line. In January 1958, Secretary
of Defense Neil H. McElroy relaxed
the 200-mile (321.8-kilometer) limit
on the Army’s tactical missiles so that
the Army could compete with Soviet
medium-range missiles. 24
Hoisting Explorer I atop Jupiter-C
Besides being instrumental in the development of the Jupiter missile for the Air
Force, the Redstone was selected as the main booster for launching satellites. The
booster was a modified Redstone, but called the Jupiter-C because of its use in the
Jupiter program. Well before the Soviet Union’s successful launch of Sputnik I on
4 October 1957, the Army had the capability of placing a satellite into orbit with the
Redstone booster, but the satellite mission had been assigned to the Navy’s Van guard
program. On 8 November, Secretary McElroy directed the Army to modify two
Jupiter-C missiles and place a satellite into orbit by March 1958. Eighty-four days
later, on 31 January 1958, the Army launched Explorer I, the first American satellite.
During the satellite program, the Army gathered valuable knowl edge about space and
demonstrated the feasibility of using tele vision reconnaissance vehicles in surveying
missile impact areas. On 1 July 1960, the Army’s satellite program was trans ferred
to the National Aero nautics and Space Administration (NASA). Under NASA’s
On the two missile programs, see Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Inno vation (New York:
Columbia Univ ersity Press, 1969). Although seven squadrons of Thor and Jupiter missiles were procured
for overseas deployment, the European allies in the end were reluctant to assume the inherent strategic
risks. Eventually, both missiles were phased out of production. Interest in the missiles as mobile landbased
weapons also waned, and in 1959, the United States announced its intention of not establishing any
further bases for liquid-fueled missiles in Europe because of their vulnerability.
24 Elizabeth C. Jolliff, “History of the Pershing Weapon System,” Historical Monograph Project no.
AMC 76M, 20 May 1974, p. 14, AMCOM files and copy in CMH files.