Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

diverging missiOns
of War William C. Endicott to plan the restoration of the coastal defenses. The
board’s report in 1886 recommended changes and additions at an estimated cost of
$127 million. The expense appeared somewhat excessive since the board was unable
to identify the enemy likely to challenge such defenses. Also, the estimate did not
take into account the cost of ammunition for the guns or land for the installations.
In addition, it was contemplated that about 80,000 men would be needed to man
the completed installations. 26 Militia artillery units were few because of the expense
in maintaining them. New York, for example, did not have a single unit trained for
duty with heavy seacoast guns. Various ideas concerning training of militia artillery
were considered, but almost nothing was accomplished. 27 Nevertheless, the Endicott
board started a building program that would continue for over twenty years.
No money was available until September 1888, when Congress voted an initial
appropriation to carry out the proposals and established a permanent Board of
Ordnance and Fortification under General Schofield to supervise the program.
Among the Endicott board’s recommenda tions were the procurement and erection
of 2,362 guns and emplacements, but by 1 April 1898, only 151 of these had been
completed. Shortly before the outbreak of the War With Spain, intensive work was
done to emplace guns and prepare additional defenses, but even these measures
remained unfinished. The war caused some changes in the coastal defense program,
but in general the hastily improvised measures taken in 1898 to protect the Atlantic
coast only stressed the necessity for more modern defenses. 28
Many types of weapons were used to arm the fortifications, the majority being
the 8-, 10-, and 12-inch guns and the largest having a range between 7 and 8 miles.
Most were mounted on disappearing gun carriages. About 300 heavy guns were
eventually installed during the Endicott period, mostly in batteries of two to four
guns each. Other weapons used were heavy mortars for high-angle fire, rapid-fire
guns for close defense, and underwater mines. At the same time, the Army abandoned
its Civil War forts around major harbors and replaced them with earthworks
and armor-plated concrete pits armed with heavy guns. 29
Despite the advances in material and the addition of five light batteries for a
total of ten in the Army, field artillery still lagged behind coast artillery. A professor
at the Military Academy in 1887 asserted that “the Artillery are in reality Infantry,
with red instead of white facings on their uniforms, and are constantly employed
26 Act of 3 Mar 1885, ch. 345, 23 Stat. 434; WD GO 26, 13 Mar 1885; Annual Report of the Secretary
of War, 1886, 1:32–33; Edward Ranson, “The Endicott Board of 1885–86 and the Coast Defenses,” Military
Review 31 (Summer 1967): 82. The Regular Army at this time was authorized fewer than 28,000 men.
For the full report, see U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Board on Fortifications or Other Defenses,
49th Cong., 1st sess., 1886, H. Doc. 49.
27 H. C. Aspinwall, “Artillery, State of New York,” Journal of the United States Artillery 3 (January
1894): 14–21; Elisha S. Benton, “The Artillery of the U.S. National Guard,” ibid. 2 (July 1893): 326–47;
Edmund C. Brush, “The Artil lery of the U.S. National Guard,” ibid. 3 (October 1894): 608–14.
28 U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of War, 50th Cong., 1st sess., 1887, H. Doc. 1, pt.
2, 1:118–21; idem, Report of the Secretary of War, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1889, H. Doc. 1, pt. 2, 1:68–74;
idem, Report of the Secretary of War, 51st Cong., 2d sess., 1890, H. Doc. 1, pt. 2, 1:5–7; Annual Report
of the Secretary of War, 1892, 1:17, 46.
29 Lewis, Seacoast Fortifications, pp. 79–88.
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