Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

POsTwar reOrganizaTiOn
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of forces. By 1952, NATO had raised its troop commitments to twenty-six combat
divisions, including the equivalent of six from the United States. 38
There was a corresponding rise in the number of American field artillery units
in Europe. In July 1950, the Army had nine field artillery battalions in Europe,
four divisional battalions and one 155-mm. howitzer and four 105-mm. howitzer
nondivisional battal ions. By August 1953, it had twenty divisional battalions, two
corps artillery headquarters, six group headquarters, and twenty-five nondivi sional
field artillery battalions on the continent. The expansion amounted to a fivefold
increase over a three-year peri od. 39
The political climate and administration changed in January 1953, when General
of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower became president. Shortly thereafter, key
administration officials spearheaded a thorough review of American military policy.
They considered the objective of “preparing for a year of maximum danger” to be
fallacious. Defense appropriations, they believed, should be long term, “a matter of
adequate protection to be projected as far into the future as the actions and apparent
purposes of others may compel us.” When completed, the review concluded that a
continuation of the high level of military spending on the scale of that during the
Korean War years would seriously damage the national economy. 40
A definite mili tary policy, popularly known as the “New Look,” emerged by
the end of 1953. The new policy envisioned an increased reliance on nuclear firepower
rather than on forces armed with conven tional weapons and introduced the
concept of “massive retaliation” and the prospective use of nuclear weapons on
future battlefields. Airpower was seen as a means of delivering nuclear firepower
that would permit an economical use of manpower. Greater mobility in the use of
armed forces was to be achieved through the development of strategic reserves that
could be readily deployed to meet sudden aggression against the United States or its
allies. Under the new concept, the United States was to furnish naval and airpower,
complicated and expen sive equipment and weapons, and highly mobile combat
forces, while the Allies were to provide the bulk of the ground troops needed to
defend their own territories. These policies, with their emphasis on airpower and
nuclear firepower, seriously threatened the rationale of the Army’s ground forces.
Although the Army managed to maintain its strength and combat structure more
or less on Korean War levels, “massive retaliation” clearly deemphasized conventional
ground troops and their supporting artillery. 41 By the mid-1950s, the Army
had reacted to these threats along two lines. One was to achieve a nuclear role for
the Army in its missile program, and the other was to reorganize its ground combat
forces for employ ment on the nuclear battlefield, to include the development and
use of tactical nuclear weapons.
38 Directory and Station List of the United States Army, July 1950 and August 1953. The U.S. units
in Europe actually consisted of five combat divisions plus three regimental combat teams.
39 Ibid.
40 Coakley, Cocke, and Griffin, “Demobilization,” p. 4, copy in CMH files.
41 Ibid., pp. 5–6, 11, copy in CMH files.