Field ArTillery - US Army Center Of Military History

CHAPTER 13
Toward a New Century
The decade of the 1990s ushered in myriad regional threats to the security of
the United States. By May 1991, the INF Treaty had contained the nuclear threat of
the superpowers, and the official disintegration of the Warsaw Pact in July and the
Soviet Union in December reduced the number of superpowers to one—the United
States. Army commanders realized that Europe would not necessarily be the only
battlefield, and they became increasingly concerned about other likely trouble spots,
such as the Middle East and Latin America.
The first sign of the new challenges to come had occurred in October 1983
in Grenada. Field artillery played only a minor role in Operation ur G e n t Fu r y,
chiefly because planners did not consider enemy artillery a threat and because they
wanted to keep the deployed force light. Also, the desire to limit collateral damage
and civilian casualties, requiring positive identification of a hostile enemy force,
mitigated the use of indirect fire. Operations there did, however, point out the need
for more planning at the joint level. 1
The next involvement in Latin America came in 1990 during Operation Ju s t
Ca u s e in Panama. Here too the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available
also restricted artillery fire, although the presence of field artillery had a strong deterrent
effect. For example, artillery in the 7th Infantry Division fired intermittently,
discouraging sniper attacks, and similar positions at roadblocks and checkpoints
enhanced security. 2
Operation De s e r t st o r m
Full-scale warfare reappeared in early 1991 with the offensive in the Persian
Gulf region against the Iraqi Army, which validated the U.S. Army’s twenty-year
effort to reform and modernize its forces. To be sure, for Operation De s e r t st o r m,
the United States and its coalition partners possessed air superiority; had a six-month
period to build up their formations during Operation De s e r t sh i e l D; enjoyed terrain
and weather excellent for conventional fighting; and, most importantly, were
highly trained and technologically sophisticated compared to the unmotivated,
undisciplined, poorly trained and equipped Iraqi soldiers. Both sides employed a
1 Scott R. McMichael, “Urgent Fury,” Field Artillery Journal, March-April 1985, pp. 8–13.
2 Joseph E. DeFrancisco, “Bayonet Artillery in Operation Just Cause,” Field Artillery, June 1990,
pp. 6–11; Robert S. Ballagh, Jr., “Red Devil Redlegs,” ibid., October 1990, pp. 40–42.